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New Governance scholars have responded to critiques of rights-based,
state-centered, top-down strategies by turning toward flexible,
collaborative public-private partnerships and by locating lawyers as
problem solvers rather than as traditional advocates. Intervening in a
variety of substantive fields, these scholars often position New Governance
as an ambitious project that seeks to usher in a new paradigm of public
problem solving. This Article pulls back on the enthusiastic embrace of New
Governance, instead situating it as a contingent model of cause lawyering
that complements, rather than replaces, previous advocacy models,
including rights-claiming litigation. To do so, this Article draws out
professional and representational objections to New Governance. First,
New Governance scholars often neglect cause lawyers, treat lawyers like
other institutional actors, or provide insufficiently concrete lawyer roles.
Accordingly, lawyers might resist New Governance practice based on their
professional identities. Next, the process-oriented focus of New Governance
theory poses representational issues for lawyers working on behalf of
marginalized constituents. New Governance process might merely
reinscribe existing power dynamics and render challenges to outcomes
more difficult. As a counterbalance to the overabundance of success stories
in the New Governance literature, this Article locates these professional
and representational objections in accounts of New Governance failure
drawn from the identity-based domains of sexual orientation, gender, and
religion. These stories of New Governance failure reveal challenges facing
New Governance theory and begin to expose conditions conducive to New
Governance practice. At the same time, they suggest the continued
relevance of rights-claiming, court-centered strategies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, many scholars and practitioners have turned
away from rights-claiming strategies. Scholars from Critical Legal Studies,'
Feminist Legal Theory,2 Critical Race Theory,3 Queer Theory,4 and Cause
Lawyering5 have leveled compelling critiques of rights discourse. These
criticisms range from theoretical critiques-pointing out the essentializing
6
and political nature of rights7-- to effectiveness critiques--contending that
public interest lawyers seduced by the "myth of rights" might hinder social
movement mobilization and place unreasonable faith in the power of courts
to remedy inequalities.8
Most recently, scholars have constructed a role for lawyers that responds
to critiques of rights-based, state-centered, top-down litigative and regulatory
strategies by turning toward experimental, flexible, collaborative public-
I See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1983).
2 See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63
TEx. L. REV. 387, 391-92, 400-01 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 644-45,
658 (1983).
3 See Devon Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1467, 1468-72 (2000); Kimberly Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989).
4 See Michael Warner, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 1 (1999).
5 See Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic
Development in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
302, 302 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) (explaining that cause
lawyering scholarship "largely calls into question the viability of legal rights strategies as
a vehicle for social reform, emphasizing the demobilizing effect of law on political
action") [hereinafter Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering]; Michael W. McCann, How
Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in How DOES LAW MATTER? 76, 77 (Bryant G.
Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
6 See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 3, at 1469.
7 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 1, at 178-79.
8 STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 13-22 (1974). See What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social
Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 6-7 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
A. Scheingold eds., 2006). Most recently, Scott Cummings made the distinction between
"political" and "efficacy" critiques of rights discourse. See Cummings, Mobilization
Lawyering, supra note 5, at 307.
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private partnerships and by locating lawyers as problem solvers rather than
as traditional advocates. 9 This scholarship has increasingly been labeled
New Governance ° and includes strands termed democratic experimentalism,
network governance, collaborative governance, associative democracy,
negotiated governance, and legal pragmatism."
While meaningful distinctions exist among the various brands of New
Governance, significant unifying themes have emerged. New Governance
scholars recognize recent trends of privatization and decentralization and
seek to reconfigure them as locations for innovation in law and policy. They
situate local stakeholders as key governance participants and position fair
process as a way for various actors-public and private, large and small,
groups and individuals, lawyers and non-lawyers, experts and lay citizens,
conservatives and progressives-to collectively imagine, implement,
monitor, and revise policy. In this depiction, courts do not declare and
enforce substantive mandates from above but rather facilitate regimes that
allow for localized, collaborative implementation of agreed-upon legal
norms. Lawyers, then, do not formulate interests in terms of hard-and-fast
rights subject to win-lose litigation. Rather, they work alongside other
stakeholders to articulate interests and integrate them within a regime that
relies on participatory process to yield win-win solutions. As New
Governance scholars imagine new roles for lawyers as collaborators,
9 Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-50 (2004).
10 There is lively and considerable debate about the commonalities among these
various projects as well as the terminology used to describe these alternative governance
efforts, and accordingly, the appropriateness of an all-encompassing term to capture these
potentially disparate strands. Nonetheless, I use the term not only for the sake of
convenience but also to suggest that there is an emerging coherence in this body of
scholarship. Compare id. at 344, with Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in
Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89
MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004) [hereinafter Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal
Thought].
1I See Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought, supra note 10, at 472;
Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 346-47; see also Susan Sturm, Gender Equity
Regimes and the Architecture of Learning, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
AND THE US 323, 328 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) [hereinafter Sturm,
Gender Equity Regimes]; William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The
Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 173-75 (2004)
[hereinafter Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights]; Helen Hershkoff & Benedict
Kingsbury, Crisis, Community, and Courts in Network Governance, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 319, 321-24 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 CoLUM. L. REV. 267,283-84 (1998).
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facilitators, and problem solvers, they forge a new model of cause lawyering,
seeking to mobilize lawyers as participants in reconfigured reform projects. 12
Many scholars position New Governance as a totalizing, ambitious
framework, seeking to usher in a new regime for addressing public problems.
Orly Lobel, for instance, argues that in "an analytical tour de
force ... contemporary legal thought and practice are pointing to the
emergence of a new paradigm-governance."'3 New Governance thought
has generally looked to address the full panoply of public issues, intervening
extensively in numerous regulatory projects, including environmental
regulation,' 4 occupational safety,'5 labor law,' 6 healthcare,17 education, 18 and
employment.' 9 In line with its far-reaching agenda, New Governance
scholarship generally has focused on success stories. Most such stories fail
12 By cause lawyering, I mean lawyering with the purpose of effecting social
change. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
Professional Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING 1, 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold
eds., 1998) ("Cause lawyering... is frequently directed at altering some aspect of the
social, economic, and political status quo.").
13 Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 343-44.
14 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Management and Regulatory Penalty
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 943-45 (2003);
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 2002
Wis. L. REV. 555, 555 (2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89
GEO. L.J. 257, 259-63 (2001); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545-49 (2000); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1997).
15 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1072-77 (2005).
16 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Public Policy Orchestrated Experimentalism in the
Regulation of Work, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2146, 2146-47 (2003).
17 See, e.g., Nan Hunter, Public-Private Health: New Directions in Public Health
Law, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 89, 89-92 (2007); Louise G. Trubek, Public
Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for Healthcare, 2002 Wis. L. REV.
575, 575-76 (2002).
18 See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destablization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1027 (2004); James Liebman
& Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model
of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183, 184
(2003); Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy. Toward Empowered Deliberation in
Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & Soc'y 73, 73-76 (2001).
19 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459-65 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, A
Structural Approach].
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to contemplate the conditions necessary for New Governance interventions
and the unique circumstances that pose challenges to such interventions.
This Article explores the challenges facing a New Governance model
and, in doing so, pulls back on the wholehearted embrace of New
Governance and the move away from state-centered strategies to suggest
thinking about how this emerging model might inform traditional cause
lawyering and public problem solving without ushering in a paradigm shift.
Instead of presenting an all-or-nothing picture of traditional court-centered
activism and New Governance, a close examination situates New
Governance as a contextual and contingent model of cause lawyering.
Moreover, such an examination demonstrates the continued relevance of
rights-claiming strategies.
This Article takes a critical view of New Governance scholarship and
practice. In doing so, it is not my intention to discount the significance of
this scholarship or the important benefits it has provided in numerous
substantive domains. Rather, by illuminating the conditions under which
New Governance might fail to operate effectively, I hope to position New
Governance as a contingent model of cause lawyering that complements,
rather than replaces, other (and specifically litigation-focused) models.
While some commentators have urged scholars "not [to] get carried away
with a giddy sense... that the state is pass6,, 20 and have warned that it is too
simplistic to claim that state-centered regulation is bound to fail,
21
comprehensive examples of New Governance failure are rare, and no one
has yet to articulate the conditions necessary for New Governance success.
This Article will hopefully open a dialogue to begin to specify the types of
situations consistent with New Governance commitments.
I use the role of lawyers (and law more generally) to interrogate New
Governance thought, and my analysis specifically draws on examples from
identity-based contexts. With its ever-expanding scope, New Governance
has begun to reach identity-based projects such as gender and race anti-
discrimination regimes. Grainne de Burca explores the ways in which
traditional human rights advocates must adapt to new forms of governance
20 Adam Crawford, Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State?
Steering, Rowing and Anchoring the Provision of Policing and Security, 10
THEORETICAL CRIMINOL. 449, 458 (2006) (internal quotations omitted).
21 See Steven Croley, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE PossIBILIrY OF
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 102 (2008); Scott Burris, Michael Kempa, & Clifford
Shearing, Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship,
41 AKRON L. REv. 1, 62 (2008); Michael Moran, Review Article: Understanding the
Regulatory State, 32 BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 391, 395-96 (2002).
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driving large-scale race discrimination reforms in the European Union.22
Susan Sturm uses the lens of New Governance to contemplate strategies that
counter gender and race inequalities in the workplace. 23 Because Sturm
offers the most extensive New Governance thinking in a domestic identity-
based context, her work is central to my analysis.24 Attention to identity-
based domains in New Governance scholarship offers my critique a
necessary coherence since identity-based projects often have hewed to
classic court-centered models in the tradition of civil rights litigation.
Identity-based work frequently features social movement lawyers who have
successfully used litigation to represent a fairly stable, identifiable group of
constituents. Accordingly, this context allows me to set up an opposition
between a litigation-focused cause lawyering model, which draws on court-
centered, publicly-articulated rights claims, and New Governance, which
stresses a turn away from this model.
For purposes of this Article, I present both the New Governance and
litigation models in highly stylized forms. Of course, neither is as monolithic
as this picture suggests. Moreover, the line between them blurs. Cause
lawyers draw on a range of advocacy models and intervene in a variety of
settings; a lawyer may engage in what I describe as New Governance
practice at the same time that she pursues a court-centered strategy.
Nonetheless, the fairly stable distinction I draw between the two models
tracks much of the New Governance literature at the same time that it
facilitates an exploration of the very real differences between them. Indeed,
other scholars have begun to observe this dichotomy. In his review of a
collection of New Governance essays, Jason Solomon argues that New
Governance "presents, directly and indirectly, a critique of and (for some) an
intentional challenge to the rights-based model of legal liberalism.,
25
Specifically referring to the identity-based domains I take up, Solomon notes
22 See Grainne de Burca, EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?, in LAW
AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 11, at 97 [hereinafter De
Burca, EU Race Discrimination Law].
23 See Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in
Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 248-54 (2006) [hereinafter Sturm, The
Architecture of Inclusion]; Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity,
2002 Wis. L. REv. 277, 278-84 (2002) [hereinafter Sturm, Workplace Equity]; Sturm, A
Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 519-20.
24 Moreover, perhaps because she is charting new territory, Sturm recognizes the
potentially conditional nature of New Governance and in that sense shares many of the
impulses motivating my project.
25 Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State,
86 TEx. L. REV. 819, 827 (2008).
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that "[flor progressives seeking to strengthen norms like antidiscrimination,
the road to success is not by 'claiming rights,' as in a traditional regulatory
model, but by 'solving problems,' as in new governance. 26
By resituating New Governance as a complementary model of cause
lawyering, I am claiming that lawyers representing identity-based groups
have many reasons to adhere to a rights-claiming litigation model instead of
wholeheartedly moving to a New Governance model. At the same time,
though, I am suggesting ways to make New Governance more profitable
through a better understanding of the conditions conducive to its use. I
recognize New Governance as an effective strategy in some contexts and
appreciate the way in which Sturm and De Burca have brought to light some
of these situations in identity-based domains. I seek, however, to understand
the contingency of New Governance practice by examining where and why
New Governance breaks down.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides a synthesis of New
Governance thought. First, I set out guiding theoretical principles, including
collaborative process, stakeholder participation, local experimentation,
public/private partnership, and flexibility. Next, I position lawyers as
problem solvers rather than as traditional advocates in a New Governance
cause lawyering model. Then I point to domains for New Governance
intervention, devoting special attention to public education and
employment-two institutional settings with particular resonance in identity-
based contexts. Finally, I show the way in which New Governance often
presents itself as a totalizing public interest law model rather than as a
complement to other frameworks.
Part HI offers a critique of New Governance thought as it is currently
constituted. This Part draws out, from a lawyering perspective, what I term
professional and representational objections to New Governance. First, I
seize on the lack of cause lawyer roles in the new model. I point out how the
New Governance framework often neglects the distinct roles of lawyers.
Scholars either treat lawyers like other institutional actors or provide
insufficiently concrete lawyer roles which fail to resonate with many public
interest cause lawyers. Next, I flip perspectives, moving from a focus on how
New Governance eschews cause lawyers to how cause lawyers might eschew
New Governance. Here I focus on the way in which the process-based focus
26 Id.; cf William E. Scheuerman, Democratic Experimentalism or Capitalist
Synchronization? Critical Reflections on Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 17 CAN. J.
LAW & JURis. 101, 124 (2004) (arguing that in the democratic experimentalist vision,
"powerful legislatures and the rule of law are typically depicted as nothing more than
moldy leftovers from a bygone liberal past" such that "[i]nsufficient attention is paid to
their normative achievements").
2009]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
of New Governance theory might pose representational issues for lawyers
whose constituents are left to a process lacking substantive commitments. I
argue that New Govemance process might merely reinscribe existing power
dynamics and render challenges to outcomes more difficult.
Part IV offers three examples of New Governance failure in identity-
27based contexts. Two of these New Governance interventions have emerged
recently in the public school domain and implicate sexual orientation- and
religion-based projects. In 2006, the non-partisan First Amendment Center
published a guide that urges schools to use New Governance tools to reach
common ground on issues of sexual orientation and religion. Not one legal
organization has signed on to or endorsed the guide. In 2006 and 2007, after
contentious litigation surrounding a sex education curriculum in
Montgomery County, Maryland, the community attempted a New
Governance strategy, using stakeholder participation to revise the curriculum
in a collaborative process. The curriculum and the parties returned to
litigation. The third example derives from the employment context and
implicates a gender-based project. The now-dissolved law firm of Heller
Ehrman LLP sought to address the under-representation of women in
partnership through the Opt-In Project, which purported to include
stakeholders and offer solutions. Heller's effort, however, produced little
change on the ground and largely ignored the unique situation of women of
color.
II. NEW GOVERNANCE
In the current political climate, and in light of high-profile rights-based
campaigns stalling in the courts, litigation, for some liberals and
progressives, has become pass6 at best and suspect at worst.28 Many scholars
27 In terms of methodology, my analysis draws on court decisions, legal briefs,
media accounts, public documents from community-based committees, roundtable
discussions, conferences, public agency proceedings, bar associations, and boards of
education, and organization literature, including press releases and legal memoranda. I
have also conducted interviews of relevant individuals, including the primary drafters of
the First Amendment Center's guide and representatives from the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), Lambda
Legal, and Alliance Defense Fund (ADF). Despite my efforts, I was not able to speak
with many of the groups and individuals implicated by these New Governance strategies,
and therefore my analysis attempts to construct an accurate picture from the materials
available to me.
28 See Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 5, at 305 (explaining how a
conservative federal judiciary, inefficient federal agencies, and cutbacks in legal services
funding "foreclosed legal advocacy opportunities for liberal public interest
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and practitioners are turning away in a more wholesale fashion from classic
litigation strategies. New Governance scholars are the latest in this cadre to
articulate an alternative vision to top-down, court-centered, rights-based
legalism. This Part sets up New Governance as a model of cause lawyering.
First, I explicate theoretical principles guiding New Governance thought.
Then I position lawyers in New Governance settings before pointing to
significant New Governance institutional domains. Finally, I comment on the
scope of New Governance scholarship.
A. Principles
New Governance scholarship reflects an increasingly institutionalized
turn by lawyers and scholars toward collaborative, negotiative governance
models that destabilize the priority of traditional litigation and recast lawyers
in explicitly problem-solving terms. New Governance has had the most
profound influence on projects that stem from administrative practice.
Traditionally, a centralized agency is charged with implementing articulated
state policy while citizens (and non-governmental organizations [NGOs]
purporting to serve their interests) are left to contest, through the
administrative system and the courts, the agency's implementation and
enforcement efforts. Rather than accept this conventional model (and the
increasingly conservative results of state-centered regulation), New
Governance scholars and practitioners have taken advantage of the blurred
boundary between public and private regulation to identify opportunities for
more collaborative problem solving that empowers stakeholders, including
individuals and NGOs. These scholars have seized on the ways in which
traditionally state-centered, top-down regulatory projects are detaching from
a centralized state apparatus and devolving from the command-and-control
regime of public law litigation.29
organizations" in the last part of the twentieth century); Ann Southworth, Conservative
Lawyers and the Contest Over the Meaning of "Public Interest Law ", 52 UCLA L. REV.
1223, 1266-67 (2005) ("While liberal public interest law groups may have been
optimistic about what they could achieve through the courts in the 1960s and 1970s, they
have since become less invested in affirmative litigation strategies.").
29 See Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott, Introduction to LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 11, at 1-2 [hereinafter De Burca &
Scott, Introduction] ("[T]he common features which have been identified involve a shift
in emphasis away from command-and-control in favour of 'regulatory' approaches which
are less rigid, less prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical
in nature."); see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 18, at 1021 (describing, in public law
litigation, "a growing and promising shift from command-and-control to experimentalist
intervention"). Abram Chayes used the term "public law litigation" to describe cases in
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New Governance scholarship places primacy on (1) collaborative
process, (2) stakeholder participation, (3) local experimentation, (4)
public/private partnership, and (5) flexible policy formation,
implementation, and monitoring. I will address each guiding principle before
locating lawyers in New Governance regimes. Because New Governance
terminology tends toward ambiguity, I will ground these principles in
examples from New Governance scholarship.
First, New Governance emphasizes a deliberative process with
acknowledged, agreed-upon norms. Fair process is trusted to produce
beneficial substantive results upon which stakeholders agree. As Carrie
Menkel-Meadow has observed about process-orientated theories, fairness
becomes a way for stakeholders to approve of outcomes.30 New Governance
thought posits that stakeholder negotiation, based on agreed-upon process
norms, may overcome the mere re-articulation of entrenched positions and
instead yield a problem-solving practice in which interests are unstable and
may converge. 3' This up-front emphasis on the potential for solutions
constitutes a process norm that is expected to translate into substantive
results. As William Simon explains, "[s]triving for consensus, even when
unsuccessful, expresses respect for all stakeholders and puts pressure on the
parties to try to understand each other and search for mutually beneficial
solutions. 32
Scholars trust a consensus-building process to defuse adversarial
interactions. In thinking about Legal Pragmatism, a brand of New
Governance, Simon explains that its more traditional public law predecessor,
Legal Liberalism, "implied that the plaintiff was a victim because it treated
the defendant as a villain and discrimination was seen as conscious and
which "the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies."
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1284 (1976).
30 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5
NEv. L.J. 347, 353-54 (2004); see also Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes, supra note 11, at
330 ("outsider participation can provide legitimacy to new governance regimes by giving
those affected by decisions a voice in determining how those problems will be
addressed").
31 See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 396 ("conflicting parties... come
together in multistakeholder negotiations, moving away from, at least tentatively,
entrenched positions about each party's particular interests"); Simon, Solving Problems
vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 179 ("If the process is properly designed, neither
the individual nor the community can know what their interests are before entering it.
Each party's conception of her own goals may change in the course of the process
because each may learn things in the process about the possibilities for realizing them.").
32 Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 182.
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malicious wrongdoing., 33 As Simon points out, though, many forms of
discrimination result from indifference or ignorance, rather than from
intent.34 Therefore, to the extent that the classic model of Legal Liberalism
"excessively moralizes the issues and engenders self-righteousness on the
part of the plaintiffs or defensiveness on the part of the defendants, it can be
counterproductive. 35 Under Simon's view, contested issues present
"opportunities for learning through mutual engagement., 36
Archon Fung's work on local school governance in Chicago provides an
illustration of this New Governance focus on process as the key to opening
up potential substantive agreement and defusing volatile interactions. Fung
explains that a poor inner-city school district suffered "paralyzing conflicts"
among parents, teachers, and the principal.37 Extremely poor student test
performance provoked an exchange of blame among the various parties. But
Fung shows how the Local School Council, which included the school
principal, teachers, parents, and community members, "transcended their
histories of conflict., 38 Interested parties "began to behave cordially to one
another and, more important, to deliberate about substantive school
improvement issues rather than using meetings as occasions for political
maneuvering., 39 The Council ultimately developed a corrective action plan
to allocate funds for school improvement that would work toward providing
a better educational environment.4 °
Next, New Governance makes stakeholder participation a central tenet.
Participatory process recognizes diverse stakeholders in public problems and
attempts to give those stakeholders a voice in policy formation. The
emphasis on stakeholder participation is perhaps best exemplified by
Simon's idea of associative democracy, which stresses that "citizens should
participate in the design and implementation of the policies that affect
them."'4  While stakeholder participation may take multiple forms,
institutions, including public agencies, private firms, and NGOs, assume
primary roles in facilitating participation.42 In participatory governance,
33 Id. at 205.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Fung, supra note 18, at 95.
38 Id. at 96.
39 Id.
40 See id.
41 Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 175.
42 See id.
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stakeholders, including organizations, interact, share responsibility, and
together generate policy.
43
In this regard, Orly Lobel's work on occupational safety is paradigmatic.
Lobel explains how a public agency like OSHA "bring[s] together various
stakeholders to create an ongoing learning environment." 44 For instance, the
Strategic Partnership Program, which mainly focuses on construction
industry hazards, creates partnerships by including employers, employees,
employee representatives, and educational institutions.45 Together these
stakeholders collaborate on workable solutions for dealing with industry
hazards. Rather than declare mandates from above, the public agency
facilitates collaborative problem solving.
Next, New Governance scholarship eschews centralized federal
regulation in favor of decentralized local authority. Indeed, the focus on
stakeholder participation relates to New Governance's emphasis on localism.
In Lobel's words, "[t]hose closest to the problem possess the best
information leading toward a potential solution.' 46 States and localities are
expected to be better situated to facilitate participatory processes, and once
solutions are found, they are best suited to monitor implementation.47
For example, in environmental regulation, Bradley Karkkainen uses the
concept of "regulatory penalty defaults" to show how federal regimes can
compel action by state and local actors.48 In watershed management, for
instance, the total maximum daily load (TMDL) program under the Clinton
administration, which threatened harsh federal regulation, incentivized state
and municipal governments to construct proactive, locally tailored clean
water programs. 49 Even more localized decision making emerges in Archon
Fung's community policing case study. Fung notes how a collaborative
process brought together various interests closest to the problem-police,
local residents, NGOs (such as the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood
Safety), and public actors (such as the mayor's office)-such that those
43 See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 377.
44 Orly Lobel, Governing Occupational Safety in the United States, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 11, at 269, 277.
41 See id.
46 Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 382.
47 See id. at 381-82.
48 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 865-66 (2006).
49 Id. at 890-92.
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affected by policing practices at the municipal level all had a voice in the
articulation of new policy.
50
Next, New Governance stresses public/private partnerships. Public
problems are not entrusted merely to public agencies, but instead private
interests affected by public action involve themselves in policy formation. In
this sense, New Governance places the focus on "the relationships among
private and public actors rather than on the substantive prescription of state
legislation, rules, and judicial decisions."'', This public-private rethinking
attempts to harness the late-twentieth century turn toward private firms and
markets to provide what had otherwise been public services. 2 The increased
interdependence between public and private actors blurs previously stable
boundaries between them.
53
Louise Trubek's work in the healthcare context provides an illustration.
Trubek points to the emergence of managed care as a New Governance
phenomenon.54 In response to employer dissatisfaction with rising healthcare
costs, private organizations began to offer packages of healthcare services at
fixed prices.55 These organizations were subject to regulation by a variety of
agencies.5 6 As consumer dissatisfaction surfaced, NGOs sprung up to act as
consumer advocates, working both with managed-care organizations
themselves and with state regulatory agencies, to represent consumer
interests as employers and regulators negotiated with private organizations.
5 7
50 Fung, supra note 18, at 74, 78.
51 Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV.
498, 505 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel, Setting the Agenda]; see also Lobel, The Renew Deal,
supra note 9, at 377 ("[T]he regulatory model promotes adversarial relations, mutual
distrust, and conflict. In contrast, under the governance model, individuals are norm-
generating subjects. They are involved in the process of developing the norms of
behavior and changing them.").
52 See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 373-74 ("In the last several decades,
a range of policies has attempted to increase the participation of nongovernmental
individuals and groups in public processes. New groups demand more access to policy
processes and a role in governing social institutions. Multiparty involvement is
understood as a way of creating norms, cultivating reform, and managing new market
realities.").
53 See id. at 374 ("Sharing tasks and responsibilities with the private sector creates
more interdependence between government and the market. In turn, increased
participation leads to fluid and permeable boundaries between private and public.").
54 Trubek, supra note 17, at 588.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 590.
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Finally, New Governance scholarship stresses the importance of
flexibility in policy formation and implementation. The policy produced by
the collaborative process does not represent a final articulation but rather a
step along the way as stakeholders consistently review the effectiveness of
current policy and make revisions accordingly. s Such flexibility is
facilitated by the decentralized, local focus of New Governance practice and
the potential for private actors to monitor and revise public policy
efficiently.
William Simon's innovative work on the Toyota manufacturing system
illustrates this feature. Simon explains how several specific norms govern
the manufacturing process. When a situation arises in which it is impossible
to follow the relevant norms, the manufacturing process is suspended (rather
than allowing employees to act with discretion). Norms are evaluated in light
of the problem, revised to reflect the new information, and implemented in
their new form.59
This discussion makes clear that the vocabulary of New Governance in
many ways mirrors the flexibility that New Governance practice embraces. It
is difficult to extract concrete principles that guide New Governance
thought, or at least to give those principles adequate meaning. Nonetheless,
with the theoretical positions and paradigmatic examples just set out, a
clearer picture emerges by acknowledging what New Governance is not.
New Governance distinguishes itself from mere informal negotiated
policymaking by deliberately constructing a process that is inclusive, making
that process transparent, and imbuing the outcomes of the process with
flexibility by consistently engaging in reflection and revision. In this sense,
there is a deliberateness about New Governance process that marks a
departure from informal political, democratic, or majoritarian decision
making.
60
At the same time, New Governance also distinguishes itself from
informal justice regimes, such as mediation, alternative dispute resolution
(ADR), and arbitration. New Governance moves away from the isolated
58 See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 396 ("The new model is better
positioned to accept uncertainty and diversity, advancing iteratively toward workable
solutions."); Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 176
(explaining the focus on "a more decentralized and flexible mode of policy
implementation").
59 See generally William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and
Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra
note 11, at 37; Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 191.
60 Cf Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 175
(explaining that New Governance practice relies on citizen representation through NGOs
rather than "spontaneous unorganized citizen action").
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resolution of specific legal disputes and moves toward the creation of a
framework that addresses systemic governance issues.6 1 While informal
justice mechanisms are backward-looking to the extent that they attempt to
remedy past wrongs, New Governance is forward-looking, resisting the
temptation to focus on past injuries and instead advocating a system that may
govern prospective relations in a flexible way. Nonetheless, there is
significant overlap between the guiding principles and motivations of New
Governance and informal justice, including the emphases on fair process,
defusing adversarial relations, and finding common ground.62 And New
Governance process seems subject to criticisms about power that scholars
leveled against informal justice regimes years earlier.63
B. Positioning Lawyers
Many of the regimes to which New Governance scholars have pointed
involve issues that implicate the public interest. Lawyers working on these
issues can surely be thought of as cause lawyers. In fact, New Governance
scholars attuned to lawyering theory stress New Governance as an emerging
model of public interest law.64 Even Lobel, in her compelling synthesis of
New Governance thought, locates New Governance within the historical
trajectory of cause lawyering.65
New Governance situates lawyers working on public issues as problem
solvers, imagining lawyers functioning not in traditional, adversarial,
litigative roles but instead as collaborators, negotiators, facilitators, and
organizers.66 The lawyer role is more flexible and less professionalized than
in a litigation model. Lawyers, like the other stakeholders with whom they
61 Cf Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 539 (pointing to "the
limitations of individualistic processes that are defined by legal claims and resolved
through after-the-fact enforcement").
62 For an excellent analysis of the ties between New Governance and negotiation,
see Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 503 (2008).
63 For critiques of informal justice systems, see THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE
(Richard L. Abel ed., vol. 1, 1982).
64 See generally Trubek, supra note 17.
65 Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 447; see also Cummings, Mobilization
Lawyering, supra note 5, at 305 (situating the movement toward stakeholder
participation and public-private partnerships within cause lawyering thought).
66 See, e.g., Sturm, Workplace Equity, supra note 23, at 320-21; Trubek, supra note
17, at 587.
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work, participate in a collaborative policymaking process without an
authoritative voice or expert role.67
In this way, New Governance positions lawyers at least partially outside
of traditional litigation. Instead of hewing to a model of Legal Liberalism,
which emphasizes rights claims and a turn to the judiciary, New Governance
locates law within less adversarial domains,68 turning away from the win-
lose scenarios of adversarial legalism and instead turning toward the
possibilities for win-win solutions through collaboration.69 As New
Governance scholar Louise Trubek explains in the healthcare context,
"[t]raditional lawyer roles, such as litigation and presenting testimony before
regulatory agencies, appear to be under-emphasized., 70 Rather, lawyers
"engage in nontraditional activities," including facilitation, performance
monitoring, and data gathering.7' In sum, New Governance thought moves
the lawyer from a specialized, expert role with operations in the legal (and
often judicial) domain to a more collaborative role with operations in a
variety of practice settings and institutional domains.72
C. Domains
While New Governance principles find their roots in administrative and
regulatory legal projects, scholars have applied them in an array of
substantive domains, including employment, occupational safety,
environmental regulation, community policing, education, corporate
67 See Sturm, Workplace Equity, supra note 23, at 298 ("Lawyers are important,
although they are by no means the exclusive intermediaries for operating across
disciplinary and institutional boundaries. Along with other intermediaries, they play the
role of mediating between principle and practice, judiciary and organization, symbols and
realities, and normative aspirations and organizational practices.").
68 See Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 198
("Conventional litigation practice [is] ... unsuited to Pragmatist problem solving."). This
is not to say that attempts at alternative governance will not lead to litigation in various
circumstances. For instance, Cary Coglianese has shown that negotiated rulemaking at
the federal administrative level, which is a New Governance phenomenon, has actually
led to a greater percentage of legal challenges to agency rules than standard rulemaking.
Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1307-17 (1997).
69 See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 379 ("A shift from adversarial
legalism to collaboration entails a move from an image of win-lose situations to a win-
win environment.").
70 Trubek, supra note 17, at 600.
71 Id.
72 See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 406.
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governance, community lawyering, anti-discrimination, constitutionalism,
and healthcare.
New Governance scholars devote particular attention to institutional
domains in which legal pronouncements require implementation and
oversight and where decision makers with discretion give meaning to legal
norms.73 For example, the public education system and the workplace, two
paradigmatic New Governance domains, resonate with New Governance's
concerns about implementation and monitoring that prompted its turn away
from public law litigation.74 For example, the path from a court's
pronouncement of a non-harassment or non-discrimination right for a student
to a school's creation and implementation of policy reflective of that right
can be littered with discretionary minefields. Similarly, a worker's right to
be free from sexual harassment might lose meaning as her employer fails to
comprehensively understand sexual harassment, to adequately educate
employees, and to police the workplace. The New Governance emphasis on
local policy formation, implementation, and monitoring seeks to remove
barriers to realizing legal norms.
Moreover, the institutional focus of New Governance recognizes the
way in which subtle forms of bias, which may not result from discriminatory
intent and may not resonate with straightforward anti-discrimination law,
create structural barriers to participation for marginalized groups. For
instance, female employees' rights to be free from sex discrimination may
not encompass, in the eyes of employers or courts, the types of
institutionalized bias that create structural barriers to women's promotion. A
stakeholder process that includes private firms attempts to change the
institutional features that perpetuate subordination and under-participation.
Susan Sturm's paradigmatic project-the representation of women
faculty in science departments at the University of Michigan-provides an
illustration that draws on both public education and the workplace as sites
for New Governance practice. Her project expertly demonstrates how
73 See id. at 444 ("At the implementation and enforcement stages, interest group
resistance and bureaucratic limits can defeat the goals of the regulatory efforts.
Government agencies often lack the resources to monitor implementation .... "); Simon,
Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 171 (critiquing Legal Liberalism
in relation to the new collaborative governance regime, Simon explains that "[d]istrust of
the lower-tier public workforce inclines Legal Liberalism toward rules, but because the
rule maker never has enough time or information to anticipate every contingency, or to
monitor compliance, the worker retains substantial discretion").
74 Including school desegregation and employment discrimination cases as
paradigmatic examples of public law litigation, Abram Chayes explains that such
litigation requires "the judge's continuing involvement in administration and
implementation." See Chayes, supra note 29, at 1284.
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concerns with institutional impediments to policy implementation, oversight,
and achievement animate New Governance work.
Moving away from traditional, court-centered public interest law, Sturm
argues that workplace equality requires pushing past the anti-discrimination
model that has characterized plaintiffs' litigation over the past few decades. 75
Sturm's concern with second-generation discrimination, which often results
from institutional and subtle forms of bias, leads her to question the efficacy
of rights-claiming litigation.76 Specifically in the university setting, Sturm
argues that lawsuits have failed to yield adequate enforcement and equality
as faculty members are reluctant to sue their university employers and often
fail when they do so, struggling to make the necessary statistical showings to
prove systemic disparate treatment or disparate impact under Title VI.
77
Indeed, in this latest case study, Sturm displays even less attachment to
court-grounded reforms than she did in her earlier New Governance work, in
which she anchored employment anti-discrimination and diversity reforms in
jurisprudential norms and frameworks.78 Critiques of her earlier approach to
second-generation employment discrimination stressed that problem solving
induced by judge-made rules may produce merely symbolic efforts toward
compliance and that courts might be reluctant or unable to hold employers
accountable for implementing effective problem-solving methods. 79 Sturm
responds to these critiques in her latest offering by moving away from court-
induced problem solving, instead focusing on how public institutions other
than courts construct systems of governance that provide accountability and
produce results.80 According to Sturm, "[i]nstead of relying on the direct
threat of judicial sanctions, institutional intermediaries use their ongoing
capacity-building role within a particular occupational sector to build
75 Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 23, at 253.
76 Id. at 248.
77 1d. at 263-64.
78 Compare Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 23, with Sturm, A
Structural Approach, supra note 19.
79 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003); William S. Laufer, Corporate
Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1343 (1999);
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1249 (2003).
80 Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 23, at 254. Samuel Bagenstos
echoes this move in his analysis of the structural approach to anti-discrimination law. See
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2006) ("today's problems of workplace bias may lie beyond the reach
of not just doctrinal tools but also the normative resources of antidiscrimination law").
[Vol. 70:2
WHEN NEW GOVERNANCE FAILS
knowledge .... introduce incentives ..., and provide accountability ....
Sturm's trajectory shows how New Governance interventions might be more
or less law-centered.
In her latest case study, Sturm looks at the example of the ADVANCE
program of the National Science Foundation (NSF) at the University of
Michigan. She explains that ADVANCE "uses public agency resources to
promote women's advancement through institutional transformation at the
university level, to develop public knowledge about effective strategies for
institutional change, and to increase incentives for universities to use that
knowledge to advance women in science.,, 82 The NSF awards institutional
transformation grants to support experimental approaches to reducing
barriers to the advancement of women. Program proposals must undertake
institutional transformation, commit to data-based decision making, state the
conceptual framework for the project, show the infrastructure necessary to
implement the plan, commit to ongoing monitoring and assessment, and plan
for comparative analysis that allows for the sharing of best practices.83
The University of Michigan's plan included initiatives aimed at four
goals: (1) recruiting more women scientists and engineers, (2) retaining
women by increasing the likelihood that women thrive at Michigan, (3)
fostering a work environment supportive of women, and (4) encouraging
women's career development.84 A working group of race and gender experts,
NGO representatives, and administrators was assigned to each goal area. 85
Framers developed an integrated strategy, which included faculty career
advising, networks supporting women scientists and engineers, departmental
transformation grants and self studies, and task forces producing policy
change.86 Strategies and Tactics Recruiting to Improve Diversity and
Excellence (STRIDE), a central component of the Michigan effort,
constituted a faculty committee charged with improving the hiring of women
scientists by using peer education.87
The Michigan ADVANCE program began in 2002, and Sturm reported
indicators of success by 2005.88 More women occupied faculty and
81 Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 23, at 251.
82 Id. at 271.
83 Id. at 277-79.
84 Id. at 285.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 285.
87 Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 23, at 258.
88 Id. at 286.
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leadership positions, and women reported an improved work environment.89
Under Sturm's measures, ADVANCE is a success. The representation of
women in Michigan's science and medical departments increased from
thirteen percent in 2001 to thirty-nine percent in 2004.90 An NSF review
panel reported "an increase in the number of departments moving from
'token' representation of women (defined as less than eighteen percent of
tenure track faculty) to 'minority' representation (eighteen to thirty-six
percent)." 91
Sturm devotes limited attention to the location of lawyers in the
ADVANCE program. She explains that lawyers redefined their roles as more
"constitutional," meaning these lawyers helped the university "establish
processes and governance systems that are accountable and principled in the
way they pursue inclusiveness., 92 In addition, lawyers working specifically
on issues of race and gender helped "to design and disseminate successful
initiatives as policy. '93 Although Sturm provides little concrete description
of the lawyers' activities, she concludes that these lawyer roles "avoid some
of the pitfalls constraining law's effectiveness under more traditional anti-
discrimination and affirmative action approaches. 94
D. A Paradigm Shift?
While New Governance represents a principled project based on strong
normative commitments, there is certainly an instrumental element to this
scholarship, which has emerged largely from progressives. New Governance
thought does not signal a turn away from otherwise successful top-down,
state-centered strategies. Rather, New Governance strategies spring from a
discontent with the results produced by traditional techniques.95 Indeed,
Sturm's move away from "the pitfalls constraining law's effectiveness" in
the anti-discrimination domain evidences this impulse.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 253.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 23, at 253.
94 Id.
95 Scott Cummings documents this phenomenon in the anti-sweatshop movement in
the Los Angeles garment industry, explaining that a turn to stakeholder collaboration was
taken up "not out of an ideological commitment to its methodology, but a practical
recognition of the barriers to other approaches." See Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In:
Law in the Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming
2009) (manuscript on file with author).
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Social movement scholars have for a long time recognized the
inadequacies of traditional legal reform projects. For instance, in his seminal
text on social movements and their relationship to law, Joel Handler pointed
to ways in which straightforward legal tactics fail.96 In noting the
problematic nature of agency-controlled hearings and the lack of meaningful
participation by disempowered groups, Handler located, some two decades
earlier, the structural inadequacies upon which New Governance would
eventually act.97 As court-centered social reform projects came to see their
progressive ends stalled by increasingly unsympathetic bureaucracies and
conservative federal judges, progressive scholars began to turn to new ways
to harness the power of law for the benefit of traditionally disempowered
groups.98 With the substantive goals animating state-centered approaches to
law moving further out of reach, scholars predictably turned to alternative
projects to produce desired results.99
Furthermore, while New Governance positions itself mainly as a project
of the Left, there is little inherently progressive about it, and many of its
strategies and principles seem decidedly centrist.'00 Indeed, New Governance
is in some ways a coming-to-terms with the conservative turn of the state in
the last several decades. In fact, New Governance resonates with neo-
liberalism; the impulse toward less centralized regulation and an appeal to
privatization reflects neo-liberal ideals which have enjoyed currency in the
American post-welfare state.' 10 Those coming from more politically
96 JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 148 (1978).
97 See id.
98 See Lobel, Setting the Agenda, supra note 51, at 502 ("The importance of New
Governance scholarship is the growing consensus among progressive legal scholars that
the regulatory state is no longer... fulfilling the promise of just and equitable
democracy."); see also Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought, supra note
10, at 483 ("For some, the empirical observation that conventional regulatory
mechanisms either are not working or are approaching the limits of their effectiveness is
enough to justify, on purely instrumental grounds, the turn to a more open and
collaborative style of decision making....").
99 See Burris et al., supra note 21, at 12.
100 See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 459 ("governance need not be a
clear-cut left or right ideological project").
101 See Burris et al., supra note 21, at 20 ("The public-private partnership has been
an emblematic device in neo-liberal systems of governance that see the state attempting
to govern at-a-distance by harnessing the ordering capacity of markets and other
autonomous local orders."); see also id. at 48 (linking New Governance themes of
"subsidiarity" and "the partnership between state and non-state actors" to "neo-liberal
approaches to the reinvention of government"); Scheuerman, supra note 26, at 125
("Although the proponents of democratic experimentalism possess impressive
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conservative perspectives might have little reason to resist New Governance
process on purely political grounds, thus giving advocates a way to devise
governance systems that seek to bring about progressive change through
centrist means.
In this sense, New Governance at least partly represents an instrumental
project, which is an important insight for evaluating the continued relevance
of traditional, state-centered, top-down litigation in some public interest
domains. Given the instrumental element of New Governance strategies, it is
somewhat surprising that many leading scholars position New Governance
as a potentially totalizing project rather than as part of an ever-expanding
lawyering repertoire. 102
Orly Lobel, in synthesizing New Governance scholarship, locates the
collaborative governance movement as a new way to explain an array of
processes in diverse substantive domains. 10 3 While Lobel acknowledges the
progressive credentials, it is nonetheless striking that little is said about the uglier facets
of a system of capitalism organized according to the principles of benchmarking,
concomitant engineering, and independent monitoring.").
102 Some scholars have articulated a hybrid model, which "acknowledges the co-
existence and engagement of law and new governance, and explores different ways of
securing their fruitful interaction." See De Burca & Scott, Introduction, supra note 29, at
6. Rather than models stressing a gap between law and New Governance or positioning
New Governance as transforming law, the hybridity thesis posits law and New
Governance as interdependent. See id. at 4-10. The hybrid model, however, looks at New
Governance and law in the same moment and in the same regime. As De Burca explains,
the hybrid model is "not a twin-track approach, with a new governance strategy providing
an alternative option should the legal approach fail to achieve its desired
results ... rather[,] the different approaches are yoked together in a single and
increasingly integrated framework." De Burca, EU Race Discrimination Law, supra note
22, at 119. While the impulse behind the hybrid model might eventually suggest the need
for an integrated lawyering model that draws on both traditional strategies and more
recent innovations, many important New Governance scholars reject the hybridity thesis,
instead advancing what have been described as the gap and transformation models of
New Governance. In the gap model, New Governance turns away from the shortcomings
of law and constructs its own, alternative regime. In the transformation model, New
Governance actually acts on law in a transformative way, "suggest[ing] that the basic
premises and normative presuppositions of law, legal form and legal function need to be
rethought in the light of changing social practices in general, and more specific changes
within public law in particular." De Burca & Scott, Introduction, supra note 29, at 10.
103 See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 443 ("The governance model
should thus be understood as an attempt to envision a third way between state-based, top-
down regulation and a single-minded reliance on market-based norms; between
centralized command-and-control regulation and individual free contract. It aims to
transcend the conceptual dichotomies of regulation and deregulation; of legal directive
and spontaneous market behavior. Inventing flexible, responsive administrative practices
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successes of traditional legal claims and state-centered strategies,' °4 she
nonetheless positions New Governance as an ambitious, expansive project
that, in dealing with the new realities of privatization and decentralization,
"views traditional patterns of hierarchical top-down regulatory control as
obsolete."1 °5 As Bradley Karkkainen remarks, her synthesis signals that
"something big is afoot.' 10 6
In a similar vein, Charles Sabel and William Simon, in their epilogue to
Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott's New Governance compilation, take
what they call a "transformation" view, claiming that "new governance is not
just a part of law, but its bright future.' '0 7 They argue that "[m]odern
jurisprudence casts an enormous shadow of doubt over the stronger claims of
traditional legality," and they assert that "history gives no reason to think
that traditional legal institutions could perform the tasks of insuring
accountability and protecting rights in a world of rapid technological and
organisational change .... ,,lO Sabel and Simon see the case studies
provided by New Governance scholars-the success stories so common in
New Governance scholarship-as suggestive of a new paradigm rather than
"the co-existence of old and new."' 0 9 Indeed, Sabel and Simon usher in the
age of New Governance with strong rhetoric:
[G]reat innovations only arise in conditions that undermine their
antecedents. The hope of innovation that only augments but otherwise does
not alter our existing capacities is certainly a more harmless fable of social
engineering than the idea of a deliberate and all encompassing revolution,
but is no less a fable, and no less informed than its revolutionary cousin by
the idea of a knowing social apex or centre. 10
may be the only alternative to big, blunt bureaucracies on the one hand, and private
market mechanisms on the other.")
104 See id. at 452-53.
105 Id. at 377; see also id. at 344 (describing "a paradigm shift from a regulatory to a
governance model, signifying a collective intellectual and programmatic project for a
new legal regime").
106 Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought, supra note 10, at 478.
107 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without
Sovereignty to LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 11, at
396. The "transformation" view is discussed supra note 102.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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Documenting the ambitious agenda of New Governance scholars, Scott
Burris, Michael Kempa, and Clifford Shearing canvass the field and note the
way in which New Governance is rapidly expanding to every substantive
domain. As they explain, "[n]o domain of public policy has been excluded"
from this new regulatory project.111 New Governance scholars "have in
common a full acceptance of the picture of polycentric, distributed
governance" such that "they tend to start from scratch" in devising effective
governance strategies. 12 Indeed, the plethora of success stories-and the
lack of accounts of failure-underscores the scope and outlook of New
Governance scholarship. As Jason Solomon comments in his review of De
Burca and Scott's New Governance compilation, "Together, the essays form
a mosaic that is largely, if not unequivocally, bright," leading one to
conclude, "the more new governance, the better."
'
"
13
Susan Sturm, who specifically brings New Governance to identity-based
issues, represents an important exception to this trend.1 4 Sturm
acknowledges that a tentative posture might "fail[] to build the infrastructure
to engage in the form of public problem solving necessary to address
complex problems," and she admits that "regulatory ambitiousness has
elevated the visibility, impact, and stature of new governance.""' 5 At the
same time, though, Sturm urges more careful attention to the conditions that
facilitate successful New Governance practice-to what she calls "the 'how'
and the 'where' of new governance."' 6 She recognizes that while use of
New Governance techniques as a strategic response to a particular situation
might be uncontroversial, New Governance presents itself as "an
overarching regulatory theory," which begs difficult questions about
desirability and feasibility.1 7
In suggesting directions for future work, Sturm urges New Governance
scholars to focus on the conditions necessary for effective public problem
1 See Burris et al., supra note 21, at 20.
112 Id. at 53. Simon notes that New Governance scholars "seem reluctant to specify
limits to the applicability of their approach, and they tend to be ambitious." See Simon,
Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 174.
113 Solomon, supra note 25, at 826.
114 See id. ("Susan Sturm's essay on efforts to help women advance in science and
engineering careers in higher education is perhaps the most cautious and domain specific
of these case studies and, in part as a result, among the most compelling.").
115 Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes, supra note 11, at 360, 324.
1161d.; see also Solomon, supra note 25, at 833 ("Going forward, the new
governance scholarship would do well to focus more on the conditions for
success....").
117 Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes, supra note 11, at 360, 323.
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solving and to think through "the relationships between new governance and
more traditional approaches."' 18 To this end, she encourages additional
accounts of New Governance success on the ground, explaining that "[t]he
process of identifying experiments that institutionalise ongoing learning and
change provides a small but significant response to the most sceptical of the
new governance critics."
'
"
19
But examples of failure, as much as examples of success, allow for "a
critical assessment of whether and when new governance operates as
intended.' 20 In other words, I seek to take cues from Sturm's call for
contextual case studies of New Governance success and instead conduct
contextual case studies of New Governance failure. Placed alongside New
Governance scholarship that reveals conditions conducive to successful
implementation, my analysis will suggest challenges that New Governance
must face as it expands its reach. Significantly, my account will also
highlight the continued relevance and desirability of traditional rights-
claiming strategies. In his recent review of De Burca and Scott's New
Governance volume, Solomon argues that "a more nuanced account of how
new governance schemes both arise and play out 'on the ground' in the
culture of adversarial legalism will help strengthen the theory's explanatory
power.' 2' By focusing on the relationship of New Governance interventions
to adversarial litigation strategies and traditional lawyer roles, my analysis
seeks to offer such an account.
In. THE PROBLEMATIC APPLICATION OF NEW GOVERNANCE
As New Governance scholars and practitioners begin to expand their
reach, especially into identity-based contexts, they will likely find cause
lawyers committed to advocacy on behalf of constituents. Such constituents
in turn look to cause lawyers for expertise and zealous representation of their
interests. New Governance scholars, however, have yet to articulate roles
that meaningfully include these lawyers in collaborative governance
interventions. Instead, New Governance process excludes many cause
lawyers, treats them like other actors, or articulates a cause lawyer role that
is insufficiently concrete and that fails to resonate with the work of these
118I, at 324. Indeed, as Solomon wonders, perhaps "the success of new
governance depends in part on the old, hoary topic of the law of remedies." Solomon,
supra note 25, at 834. That is, perhaps litigation and enforcement mechanisms are
necessary for successful New Governance practice.
119 Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes, supra note 11, at 325.
120 ld.
121 Solomon, supra note 25, at 82 1.
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lawyers. This positioning of lawyers by New Governance scholars yields
what I term "professional objections" to New Governance practice, which
affect the uptake, implementation, and ultimate success of New Governance.
In addition, lawyers might see currently available New Governance
processes, in certain circumstances, as detrimental to the interests they
represent. Purportedly participatory processes may in some instances merely
reinscribe existing power dynamics, leaving outsider interests on the outside.
Moreover, contesting outcomes becomes more difficult when such outcomes
carry the presumption of community endorsement. This second set of
concerns constitutes what I term "representational objections."
This Part identifies and explains the professional and representational
objections that present obstacles to New Governance implementation. The
two sets of objections are intimately connected and together present a
compelling basis on which cause lawyers in identity-based contexts might
resist New Governance interventions.
A. Professional Objections
Even though New Governance presents itself as a new model for public
interest advocacy, much New Governance scholarship neglects the role of
lawyers, or, more precisely, fails to distinguish lawyers from other
institutional actors. When it does articulate roles for lawyers qua lawyers,
such roles are insufficiently concrete.
1. Excluding Lawyers, or Excluding Lawyers qua Lawyers
First, lawyers-and particularly traditional public interest lawyers-are
often peripheral to New Governance practice. Susan Sturm's ADVANCE
analysis provides a useful example. Sturm contends that concerns about
lawyer status and interest group representation "seem inapposite" in her New
Governance case study, since "lawyers acting on behalf of excluded groups
are largely absent from the institutional change process. 122 Indeed, when
Susan Carle responds to the ADVANCE case study by pointing to the
underdeveloped lawyer roles, Sturm replies that Carle makes "lawyers much
more central then they actually were to ADVANCE or than they necessarily
should be.' 1
23
122 Susan Sturm, Conclusion to Responses-The Architecture of Inclusion:
Interdisciplinary Insights of Pursuing Institutional Citizenship, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
409, 424 (2007) [hereinafter Sturm, Conclusion to Responses].
123 Id.
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Next, New Governance scholarship theorizes lawyer positions as
detached from distinct lawyer roles and instead tied to more general New
Governance roles. That is, the lack of emphasis on professional identity and
legal expertise leads to a lawyer position often indistinguishable from the
roles of other institutional actors. In the ADVANCE case study, for instance,
lawyers act as "institutional intermediaries" but "are by no means the
exclusive intermediaries for operating across disciplinary and institutional
boundaries. ' '1 24 Even Louise Trubek, who continues to see lawyers as central
to New Governance in the healthcare domain, contends that "[t]he lawyer
has moved from the role of an adversary in the legislature, courts, and
agencies to a collaborator engaged in a series of alliances to develop and
implement policy. ' 125 While lawyers in Trubek's model "provide the
knowledge of how public and private institution's [sic] function, reassure the
consumers that their voices will be heard, and speak out when there are
malfunctions[,] ... they do not do it alone; they are part of a multi-faceted
approach."'126 Even when lawyers' professional identity is valued, such
identity is indistinguishable from that of other collaborators. For instance,
Lobel notes that "diverse professionals-including lawyers, doctors, social
workers, and educators-collaborate to address... broad issues.' 27
Lawyers do not occupy specialized roles. Instead, they function primarily as
collaborators-a role that at times seems fungible.
Given New Governance's breadth and its far-reaching aspirations, public
interest lawyers seem essential to the successful uptake of New Governance
innovations and vital to the representation of groups traditionally excluded
from participatory process. While Sturm argues that "[l]awyers representing
excluded groups must figure out what their role is when litigation does not
drive an institutional change process,' 28 I contend that New Governance
scholars must also work toward articulating new, or at least reinvented, roles
for these lawyers. Indeed, Sturm seems to overlook the key role that lawyers
may (and must) continue to play if New Governance is to become an
overarching public problem-solving regime. The expectation that lawyers
will figure out their new roles on their own-or, worse yet, the belief that it
does not matter if they fail to do so-attempts to build a new paradigm of
public interest law without those most instrumental to the prominence of the
previous paradigm.
124 Sturm, Workplace Equity, supra note 23, at 298.
125 Trubek, supra note 17, at 586.
126 Id. at 600-01.
127 Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 387.
128 Sturm, Conclusion to Responses, supra note 122, at 424.
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New Governance scholarship's lack of explicit lawyering roles, and its
concomitant move away from adversarial legalism, poses an initial problem
of uptake by cause lawyers whose professional identities are grounded in
court-centered activism. Cause lawyers have related reasons, based on their
identities as lawyers, to resist current articulations of New Governance
process: (1) the maintenance of professional identity, (2) a market interest in
legal conflict, (3) the preservation of litigation options, and (4) the centrality
of legal norms.
First, cause lawyers representing social movements may resist a process
that marginalizes their professional status and assigns them a peripheral role
in what is in essence a public interest law project. Such a process threatens
the careers many cause lawyers have worked to build and casts their
specialized skill set as largely irrelevant. Indeed, New Governance may even
approach this skill set, which is characterized by court-centered, adversarial
advocacy, with suspicion. Cause lawyers might wonder whether in
submitting to New Governance regimes, they are complicit in their own
career suicide.
Second, cause lawyers engaged in public interest litigation stake their
livelihood on legal conflict. Joel Handler explains that public interest
lawyers "create and define problems, which serve the needs of the firm as
well as the social-reform group.' 129 Not only do they advance movement
goals, but the lawyers also "gain from the publicity., 130 Moreover, well-
publicized litigation campaigns help fundraising efforts, and professional
social movement lawyers rely on such fundraising to survive. Accordingly,
cause lawyers have self-interested reasons to resist New Governance
processes. The move away from high-profile litigation threatens the
prominence and financial security of cause lawyers who have made careers
out of litigation.13
Third, the move toward a comprehensive non-litigation model might
undermine selected attempts at litigation and thereby affect a cause lawyer's
ability to fill a litigation-centered role. I am not suggesting that public
interest lawyers do not engage in non-litigation techniques; in fact, most use
litigation as just one tool among many. Rather, I am arguing that an upfront
commitment to a New Governance non-litigation process might compromise
the lawyer's ability to turn toward litigation later. That is, the deliberateness
and formality of New Governance as non-litigation might make a turn
129 HANDLER, supra note 96, at 31.
130 1d.
131 Cf Solomon, supra note 25, at 850 (noting in the private law context that
"[I]awyers will also need to be reassured that it is in their economic interest to support (or
at least not oppose) new governance").
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toward litigation seem hypocritical and might paint the lawyer and the
movement she represents in an unfavorable light. In effect, the same impulse
that drives some New Governance practice-a turn away from
adversarialism-may make uptake by lawyers who want at least to preserve
adversarial options more challenging.
Finally, New Governance models seek to move away from law-centered
strategies, instead casting norms as flexible and revisable. Hard legal rules
and decrees do not reflect a New Governance ethic. Cause lawyers might
resist collaborative regimes that are insufficiently law-centered to the extent
that such regimes do not resonate with professional lawyering roles. Without
elaboration of legal principles, cause lawyers might see New Governance
process as a non-legal strategy that marginalizes the role of law and lawyers
both to the detriment of their movements and to their own professional self-
interest.
Furthermore, the lack of a law-based focus might only reinforce the
desire to push litigation as a way to secure favorable doctrinal baselines that
would inform any such process. Even New Governance scholars admit that
background legal norms inevitably shape and inform collaborative process.
Cause lawyers engaged in litigation campaigns may see room to expand
upon a particular constituency's rights. With stronger rights recognition, the
New Governance process might look materially different. In this sense,
cause lawyers might have a temporally contingent resistance to New
Governance practice.
2. Role Ambiguity and Discounting Strengths
Even as some New Governance accounts deemphasize the significance
of lawyers, others recognize the important roles that lawyers might play in
New Governance practice. In the healthcare context, for instance, Louise
Trubek argues that while "the roles and skills of the public interest lawyer
must evolve to adapt to the changes in governance, the public interest lawyer
will remain a key player in this new scheme." 132 Unfortunately, though,
scholars' attempts to articulate explicit lawyer roles have been vague and fail
to resonate with many cause lawyers.
For instance, in her account of a structural approach in employment
discrimination, Susan Sturm discusses "problem-solving lawyers,"
explaining their roles as "catalysts, poolers of information, and sources of
accountability.' 33 Likewise, in describing "lawyers as public problem
solvers" in her ADVANCE case study, Sturm articulates their roles as
132 See Trubek, supra note 17, at 576.
133 Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 527.
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"intermediaries, problem solvers, institutional designers, and information
entrepreneurs."' 134 But in both accounts her analysis does little to concretize
these roles, instead leaving lawyers to use their own visions to understand
these concepts, or, more likely, reject such roles as incomplete, unstable, and
in tension with their own understandings of lawyering.
Furthermore, when scholars articulate lawyer roles, they pay scant
attention to public lawyers. For instance, Trubek notes that lawyers working
in New Governance regimes are not found, as with conventional public
interest law practice, in non-profit law firms. Instead, she points to lawyers
in a variety of settings, arguing that "lawyers' workplace has shifted.' ' 135 In
line with New Governance's shift toward privatized, market-based solutions,
Trubek explains that, in the healthcare context, lawyers working within
managed-care organizations are key advocates in the New Governance
regime. 116 Similarly, when addressing lawyers in her work on race and
gender discrimination in employment, Sturm largely neglects the types of
public lawyers often associated with such issues, instead focusing on private
practitioners, in-house counsel, and university lawyers.' 
37
When Sturm addresses public interest lawyers at NGOs, she focuses on
lawyers who already take a generally suspicious view of litigation. For
instance, her study of workplace equity regimes includes the National
Employment Law Project (NELP) in an attempt to situate "advocacy
organizations as mediating institutions;" NELP, though, "embraces a
structural approach to problems of low-wage and immigrant
workers.... defin[ing] its role in relation to problems, projects, and
constituencies, rather than in relation to cases, dockets, or lawyers' fields of
expertise or practice."'138 While one could imagine that a regime tackling
race and gender discrimination might include lawyers from organizations
like the NAACP, Legal Momentum, and the ACLU, no such lawyers are
included. Instead, we are left with no indication of the possibilities offered
by these new strategies when they eventually come to depend on buy-in, at
least to some degree, from cause lawyers working in these fields.
In a direct response to Sturm's ADVANCE case study, Susan Carle
articulates the most pointed critique to date of the lawyer's role in New
Governance models, explaining that New Governance scholarship has been
134 Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 23, at 331-32.
135 Trubek, supra note 17, at 598.
136 See id.
137 See generally Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19; Sturm, Workplace
Equity, supra note 23.
138 Sturm, Workplace Equity, supra note 23, at 317.
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vague about how exactly lawyers reconcile new facilitative and problem-
solving roles with their ethical and professional responsibilities to clients.139
Carle notes that scholars in the collaborative governance movement take the
normative position that "lawyers should adopt a more independent, justice-
seeking stance vis-A-vis their clients' interests, rather than following the
traditional model which emphasizes lawyers' client-centered, zealous
advocacy role."'140 She advises that "[f]uture work examining the intersection
of new institutional change paradigms and lawyering theory must explore
these issues concerning 'interest representation. ' '' 141 Carle's critique
suggests that when New Governance actually seeks to define lawyer roles, it
does so in ways that reject lawyers' familiar roles and strengths, which
largely center on zealous representation.
Of course, a new model of cause lawyering logically calls for new
models of cause lawyers, but New Governance scholarship largely has
missed opportunities to articulate such new roles in ways that nonetheless
integrate proven strengths of public interest lawyers. Such lawyers, who
drive a substantial portion of the action relating to identity-based issues (like
sexual orientation, religion, race, and gender) and who excel at court-
centered advocacy on behalf of identity-based group "clients," can hardly be
expected to abandon their movement members to a process that might
merely reinscribe power differentials without the checks offered by zealous
advocacy and clear representation. This is not to say that an articulated role
for such lawyers will find them rushing from the courtroom to the
conference room, but it does suggest a challenge that collaborative process
models must face when entering domains saturated with litigation-savvy
cause lawyers.
In constructing a process that in significant ways requires uptake by
cause lawyers as it seeks to supplant a traditional litigation model, New
Governance scholars miss important opportunities to concretize lawyer roles
in service of New Governance process. In an attempt to take Carle's critique
in a more prescriptive direction, I will point to two specific instances of
these missed opportunities.
139 See Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times:
Can New Models for Institutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective Structural
Change?, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 323, 337-38 (2007) (in assessing Sturm's study of
the University of Michigan's ADVANCE program, Carle admits that she was "left with
many unanswered questions about how lawyers should perform [problem-solving] roles"
and notes that from Sturm's study "[wie do not get a great deal of detail about these
lawyers").
140 Id. at 340.
141 Id. at 338.
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First, Sturm contemplates the possibilities for grassroots participation in
new collaborative processes, admitting that "New governance scholarship is
at best vague about the processes for developing outsider groups' capacity to
engage effectively and thus participate as 'equals' in the deliberative
process." 142 Sturm expresses hope that scholars and practitioners can
construct processes that "enable meaningful participation by disempowered
groups, and that do not simply privilege experts,"' 14 3 and warns that without
attention to this concern, involvement by grassroots organizations will be
"limited to the relatively rare situations where outsiders have already
organized sufficiently to engage in effective collective action."'
144
I contend that positioning traditional public interest lawyers in these new
collaborative processes may offer a way to mobilize legal professionals for
grassroots organizing purposes. Remaining cognizant of the pointed critiques
of lawyers as organizers, we might nonetheless think of social movement
lawyers as having the resources and know-how to identify and mobilize
significant community interests. 145 After all, these lawyers are in the
business of publicly giving voice to the grievances of marginalized
communities.
Furthermore, cause lawyering scholarship suggests that New
Governance scholars should approach the idea of "free-agent" lawyers with
caution. The amorphous, free-agent lawyer role articulated by some New
Governance scholars poses significant problems for the representational
ethics and duties of cause lawyers. Expressing concern about "uncoupling
lawyers' work from the interests or perspectives of particular clients," Carle
connects her fear of a free-agent lawyer to the fear other scholars have
articulated about representation of a diverse group by a single organization
or lawyer. 146 She explains that "[1]awyers may not simply impute interests to
client classes without... consultative outreach, lest we return to the old
'lawyer knows best' models that legal ethicists have toiled so hard to
displace."'147 Here, Carle makes a key move, pointing to the lessons that New
142 Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 23, at 269.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 William Simon notes that "participatory engagement... may be a burden to
some," explaining that "the need to articulate your views to strangers and to do so in the
form of publicly acceptable reasons may be oppressive and alienating." Simon, Solving
Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 175. Cause lawyers, accustomed to
representing disempowered groups, might help to articulate views for those entering the
process as outsiders.
146 Carle, supra note 139, at 341-42.
14 7 Id. at 342.
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Governance scholars can learn from critical lawyering and poverty lawyering
scholarship. 148 In this sense, Carle notes that "attention to a client's
perspective serves an important disciplinary function, especially for lawyers
engaged in broad-scale institutional reform.' ' 149 Therefore, merely placing
cause lawyers in collaborative processes will not necessarily ensure
representation of the purported outsider group. Rather, a more client-
centered approach would see cause lawyers facilitate sustained outsider
participation rather than function as a proxy for such interests. In this way,
thinking about representational ethics, which is key to the work of many
social movement lawyers, would compel New Governance scholars to work
toward a model that considers outsiders' views in meaningful, sustainable
ways and that enlists cause lawyers in this endeavor. 50
Next, New Governance has an uneasy relationship with the idea of
expertise, recognizing the importance of expert knowledge but including
within that notion a range of information on public problems from a variety
of professionals and non-professionals. Indeed, this idea ties to the lack of
role specificity that New Governance scholars offer lawyers. Such scholars
minimize a lawyer's claim to expertise and professional status at the same
time that they emphasize information gathering.' 5 ' For instance, in the
148 See id. ("It thus seems to me that the literature on lawyering that is developing as
part of new governance scholarship should take heed of the lessons learned from the
many decades of literature that followed Derrick Bell's important Article, Serving Two
Masters.").
149 lId.
150 At the same time, this client-centered approach is tempered by critical
assessments of social movement lawyers, which question the authenticity and stability of
the concept of the "client group." This scholarship urges lawyers to contemplate their
constitutive power, seeing the ways in which they might, through their representation,
actually constitute the group in a particular way. See Janet E. Halley, "Like Race"
Arguments, in WHAT'S LEFT OF THEORY? NEW WORK ON THE POLMCS OF LITERARY
THEORY 40, 46 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that lawyers can "make up
people" and "alter the social definition of the group itself'). Public interest lawyers
representing social movements might imagine a community of constituents that matches
the lawyers' own vision for the movement rather than a vision that reflects the diverse
individuals that actually comprise the group. See Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)covering
Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARv. L. REv. 805, 835 (2008) ("For
critical theorists, client or group identity is neither natural nor necessary. Rather, it is
constructed by advocacy, adjudication, and regulation."). This made-up client community
might very well exclude real individuals, further marginalizing members of an already
marginalized community.
151 See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 373 (explaining that in turning
away from a focus on trained, expert legal professionals, New Governance "diversifies
the types of expertise and experience that.., new actors bring to the table").
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healthcare context, Trubek comments that "[c]ollaborations among
stakeholders and experts serve two purposes: the exchange of information
and expert knowledge and the pooling of this information to create new
techniques and systems."' 52 Positioning the public interest lawyer in such
collaborations, Trubek explains that " [t]he lawyer is no longer considered a
social engineer with magical knowledge who can redesign anything using
her own expertise."153 She connects this realization not only to a "general
reduction in the power of expertise" but also to increased "skepticism
regarding the exclusiveness of lawyer expertise and the public's willingness
to use other non-traditional sources of authority.
154
I want to urge New Governance scholars to resituate legal expertise as
an important form of knowledge, even if just one form among many, in a
way that suggests a continued (even if limited) professionalized, expert role
for lawyers in deliberative processes. Lawyers' expertise and mastery of the
legal norms that serve as the backdrop to collaborative problem solving may
infuse process with some substantive baselines, which are perhaps necessary
to convince stakeholders to come to the table. If traditionally disempowered
groups and individuals could count on cause lawyers to articulate baseline
legal rights and to educate participants about legal norms, such groups and
individuals might have more confidence that New Governance process will
account for their interests in a meaningful way. In this sense, lawyer
expertise may actually facilitate the citizen participation that New
Governance values and the outsider inclusion that New Governance requires.
B. Representational Objections
Aside from concerns about professional identity and role definition,
cause lawyers might have strategic and ethical reasons related to client
representation for resisting New Governance process in select situations.
Such lawyers might fear that a process that purports to include marginalized
stakeholders and work toward win-win solutions might instead reinscribe
existing power dynamics to the detriment of the client group. This concern is
heightened in situations lacking strong shared substantive commitments. In
the end, such a process might produce results that would otherwise exist in
its absence, and yet the appearance of stakeholder collaboration might make
the outcomes more difficult to contest and thereby further complicate the
task of the committed cause lawyer.
152 Trubek, supra note 17, at 586.
1531d.
154 Id.
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1. Trusting Substance to Process
New Governance scholarship focuses on process norms as a way to
engage diverse stakeholders in collaborative deliberation and thereby yield
substantive results. This faith in process, discussed Part II.A., supra,
assumes that interest groups' positions are unstable. As Orly Lobel explains,
"[iln a collaborative environment, the capacities as well as the identities of
the participants evolve substantially over time."' 55 Echoing this notion of
changing positions and interests, William Simon contends that,
[i]f the process is properly designed, neither the individual nor the
community can know what their interests are before entering it. Each party's
conception of her own goals may change in the course of the process
because each may learn things in the process about the possibilities for
realizing them.1
56
Yet much of the collaborative governance scholarship has been applied
in situations where some shared ground and commitments exist rather than
those featuring diametrically opposed views and constituencies. As Jason
Solomon puts it, "all the problem solvers are on the same team."'' 57 For
instance, in one of the domains in which Susan Sturm intervenes-higher
education-there is general agreement that the lack of women faculty in the
sciences is problematic, even if disagreement exists about the reasons for the
problem or the best remedies. 158 Such a situation, in which an identity-based
movement's equality and inclusion norms are deeply entrenched, does not, at
this point, mirror other contexts, both in gender-based advocacy and other
identity-based projects, which instead may feature divergent commitments
155 Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 378.
156 Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 179.
157 Solomon, supra note 25, at 834. Cf Bagenstos, supra note 80, at 37 (explaining
that "precisely because they are so widely-accepted," "outcome-based measures [in
particular contexts] can provide the kind of focal point necessary to make the democratic-
experimentalist process of information pooling and benchmarking operate").
158 See Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 23, at 255-56 (explaining
that all those involved "express[] support for the goal of diversifying the faculty, but
when faced with the question of how to reach that goal, many throw up their hands in
frustration"); see also Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at
205 (explaining that a problem-solving perspective recognizes "an interest in fair
treatment shared by both the firm and employees").
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and intense disagreement regarding baseline norms.15 9 It is necessary, then,
to explore the extent to which New Governance techniques work in identity-
based contexts that lack baseline agreements.
Without lawyer uptake and in light of a lack of stable, resonant lawyer
roles, individuals on the ground must consider the viability of a process that
promises substantive agreement based on process norms. Importantly,
through their advocacy, the cause lawyers now sitting on the sidelines may
have shaped their constituents' perspectives on the proposed process
interventions. That is, New Governance interventions face the additional
challenge of dislodging issues from a court-centered, adversarial discourse
and transplanting such issues into a collaborative scheme that aspires to be
less adversarial and less politicized.
This challenge might be most acute in a situation characterized by
movement/countermovement dynamics. Take, for instance, the gay rights
and Christian Right 160 movements. As I will show in Part IV, infra, the
intensely adversarial legal and political relationship between these two
movements poses a perhaps insurmountable challenge to the consensus norm
that New Governance trusts to defuse adversarial interactions and to expose
win-win solutions. Instead, interests seem highly stable, entrenched, and
comprehensive. Each movement maintains a broad ideological position that
encompasses a range of important issues. The gay rights movement
emphasizes what should change-focusing on norms about sexuality and the
family-and the Christian Right countermovement emphasizes what should
not-focusing on normative heterosexuality and the biological, mother-
father family. 161 Openings for common substance rarely emerge, and trust in
a process that promises such common ground seems unlikely.
Moreover, a narrative that positions movements as diametrically
opposed and mutually distrustful politicizes substance in a way that obscures
159 See Solomon, supra note 25, at 848 ("Why do new governance scholars think
that interests accustomed to battling over policy will put down their swords, share
information, and collaborate?").
160 1 use this term, which tracks the terminology used in the relevant scholarly
literature, to describe a movement comprised of segments of evangelical Christianity,
fundamentalist Christianity, and Catholicism. The movement, of course, should not be
thought of as a monolith and certainly exhibits internal disagreement.
161 Mayer Zald and Bert Useem articulated this common
movement/countermovement dynamic in their foundational work on social movements.
See Mayer N. Zald & Bert Useem, Movement and Countermovement Interaction:
Mobilization, Tactics, and State Involvement, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 247, 270 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1987);
see also Mayer N. Zald, The Future of Social Movements, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 319, 328 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1987).
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points for potential common ground. In this sense, not only is the lack of
substance in New Governance models troubling in itself, but
movement/countermovement relationships may make attempts to remedy
these substantive deficiencies especially difficult.
New Governance scholars have yet to grapple with public problems
complicated by such intense movement/countermovement dynamics. Instead,
interventions in identity-based domains, pioneered by Sturm and De Burca,
occupy spaces in which interested parties share baseline norms (and in
which forces that are not mobilized toward the articulated goal are
indifferent at best).
2. Sham Process, Reinscribing Power, and Privatizing Harm
While a lack of lawyer uptake and movement/countermovement
dynamics might hinder participation in a system that trusts process to
produce substance, when the actual process is undertaken, the absence of
cause lawyers and the lack of substantive baselines might exacerbate (rather
than alleviate) problems of interest representation. In fact, fears relating to
interest representation may lead cause lawyers themselves to resist New
Governance interventions and to advise their constituents against
participation. Outsider groups would be submitting to a process, often
without strong advocates, in which their interests might be left out or only
nominally considered. In the end, the results of the process might merely
reinscribe existing power dynamics, allowing the "haves" to come out ahead.
With the air of legitimacy granted by a superficially participatory
process, cause lawyers who seek to contest such results on behalf of their
marginalized clients might find that New Governance interventions make
their court-centered jobs more challenging. Indeed, courts might defer to a
process that purports to embody community input and consensus, thereby
leaving the "have-nots" in an even more difficult position.
Other scholars have questioned the inclusiveness of participatory
governance systems. Susan Carle urges more scholarly attention to the
question "of how to avoid processes becoming a mere sham in which all
affected interests are ostensibly taken into account, but the insiders and their
already vested interests in the end win out once again., 162 Helen Hershkoff
and Benedict Kingsbury, offering a critique of James Liebman and Charles
Sabel's network governance proposal in the public education domain, worry
that "network deliberation may tend toward a homogenization of culture and
162 See Carle, supra note 139, at 349. Sabel and Simon concede that "the dynamics
of unequal bargaining power affect deliberative as well as pluralist negotiations." Sabel
& Simon, supra note 18, at 1100.
2009]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the privileging of professionally-credentialed rationality and dominant-group
values.' '163 Archon Fung, in the school reform and community policing
contexts, points to the danger of "domination or capture by powerful
factions. '' 164
Traditional outsiders might face multiple barriers to participation.
165
Outsiders may distrust a process that they see as run by traditional insidergroups, 166 and they might feel damaged by previous experiences. 167 New
Governance regimes might merely replicate previous top-down attempts at
participatory mechanisms, where disempowered groups attempt to move
decision makers from pre-determined positions.1
68
This potential might render New Governance susceptible to strategic,
opportunistic deployment. In circumstances where meaningful participatory
inclusiveness seems unlikely, collaborative governance may offer a way to
legitimate the insider group's agenda. That is, some groups might embrace
New Governance process to facilitate a power grab rather than to yield a
win-win solution.
In this sense, the power of NGOs, which play prominent roles in New
Governance models, becomes an important factor in assessing the potential
of New Governance interventions. Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila
Shamir, and Chantal Thomas have shown the way in which certain NGOs
may gain power inside governing bodies such that a particular vision and
agenda of the NGO's constituent group displaces competing visions and
163 Hershkoff & Kingsbury, supra note 11, at 322.
164 Fung, supra note 18, at 75.
165 See John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Appendix-The Trend of Social
Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization (1967), reprinted
in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 161, at 337, 342
(noting that "[e]ducational attainment and economic position both correlate positively
with sociopolitical participation").
166 See Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes, supra note 11, at 331 (explaining that
"[d]isempowered groups... may distrust deliberative processes that are set up and run
by management").
167 See Carle, supra note 139, at 341 (criticizing New Governance's "focus on
mainstream citizens with an ability to participate actively and exert agency freely, as
opposed to marginalized persons who may be too damaged to engage in active
involvement in the political process").
168 See HANDLER, supra note 96, at 203-04 (explaining the problem of the "sham
hearing," Handler notes that "[b]y the time social-reform groups have the chance to
exercise their right to participate, the key decisions have been made, the bureaucracy is in
a fixed position, and the social-reform groups are placed in the difficult position of trying
to get the agency to change its mind").
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agendas. 169 Halley and her co-authors look at this phenomenon in the context
of international women's rights work, observing what they label as
"Governance Feminism." 170 Dominance by a particular brand of feminism
and appropriation of state power for that feminism's needs may also occur
on the domestic stage. 17 1 NGOs, then, might capture New Governance
systems for their own ends. If NGOs have sufficiently implanted themselves
as insiders and if they have received the support of other insiders, they may
steer consensus-building processes toward their own agendas. Such a move
would render outsider interests even more marginal. The prevailing NGOs
would not only have the support of insiders, but their gains would have been
legitimated through a process that purports to meaningfully account for all
affected interests.
Furthermore, the semi-privatization of collaborative governance regimes
might only compound the sense of disempowerment experienced by
outsiders with nominal representation. In more traditional regulatory and
litigation models, individuals, and the cause lawyers who represent them, are
able to voice their sense of injury in a public forum and to use advocacy and
rights-claiming to channel feelings of alienation and to raise consciousness
among similarly situated individuals. 7 2 Localized, semi-privatized New
Governance regimes might sacrifice these important effects for social
movements and the lawyers who represent them.
With the turn away from state-centered strategies and the
accommodation of some element of privatization, New Governance models
might not only perpetuate existing power differentials but might shroud such
differences, allowing them to go unnoticed. 173 As Scott Cummings points out
169 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the
International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work,
& Sex Trafficking. Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 335 (2006).
170 See id. at 336.
171 See Carle, supra note 139, at 345.
172 Cf Scheuerman, supra note 26, at 119, 122 (arguing that democratic
experimentalists are too quick "to discard certain modem liberal democratic institutional
achievements (for example, ambitious lawmaking by centralized representative bodies
and core elements of the rule of law)," Scheuerman notes that "little if any attention is
paid to ... the services liberal legal virtues potentially perform for the socially excluded
and politically underrepresented").
173 See Robert S. Gilmour and Laura S. Jensen, Reinventing Government
Accountability: Public Functions, Privatization, and the Meaning of "State Action ", 58
PuB. ADMIN. REv. 247, 247 (1998) ("The dimension of governance most often altered
significantly by privatization is that of public accountability."); see also Sturm, Gender
Equity Regimes, supra note 11, at 331 (explaining that "[s]ome deliberative processes
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in his insightful analysis of community economic development lawyering,
while these "new models of cause lawyering have the potential to promote
participation and empowerment, they can also channel political action into
processes of collaboration and negotiation that shape a more quiescent form
of mobilization, resulting in the political disadvantage and co-optation of
weaker groups." 174 Outcomes would become more difficult to contest by
outsider groups, who, on the face of it, participated in the process.
A central concern has emerged from this discussion: New Governance
systems may promise meaningful participation for outsider interests but may
fail to deliver; instead, New Governance regimes might merely confirm the
status of outsider groups. Attempts at New Governance participatory
structures may rhetorically include disempowered stakeholders but actually
cede little or no power. 75 This phenomenon points to the relationship
between traditional public interest advocacy and the shift toward New
Governance. Rights-claiming litigation has an important legitimating effect
for disempowered groups. 176 This is especially true when the group
prevails. 177 The legitimating effect of litigation, which empowers group
members 78 and garners support from elites, 179 has particular resonance when
thinking about New Governance, which presupposes stakeholder status for
those implicated by a particular problem or set of issues.
operate outside formal democratic institutions, and may lack methods of accountability
connecting direct participants to the concerns and views of the group they represent").
174 See Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 5, at 303.
175 See Burris et al., supra note 21, at 49. For instance, some community policing
models employ a "rhetorical commitment from the police to 'listen' to the community"
without corresponding structural changes that give actual power to community members.
See id. At the next level, these schemes might give some influence to local stakeholders
but no actual decision-making power. See id.
176 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal
Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARv. L. REv. 937, 957 (2007) ("rights-
based discourse has a legitimation effect, since rights mythically present themselves as
outside and above politics").
177 See HANDLER, supra note 96, at 30-31 ("Law reformers and foundations feel the
need for legitimation from courts. One potent defense against political attack would be a
favorable decision by a federal court of appeals since it would appear that the law
reformers had acted properly, that their claims were justified in law.").
178 See id. at 202 ("Through public interest law, underrepresented groups would not
only obtain access but they would be listened to.").
179 See id. at 31 ("Court cases, particularly when they stop a bulldozer or unmask
some outrageous practice, can be dramatic and newsworthy, and provide the legitimacy
so necessary for support from elites.").
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Effective participation in New Governance collaboration-participation
that has real implications for process and outcomes-requires a meaningful
seat at the proverbial table. Access by outsider groups must be meaningful in
that such groups can actually affect decision making. 180 Indeed, as Susan
Sturm contemplates, if "far-reaching social equity [is] both a goal and a
precondition for [New Governance] success .... then equality is necessary
for new governance to work in the first place."'
' 81
This is a crucial moment in thinking about traditional rights-based
advocacy and New Governance lawyering. New Governance relies on a
model of participation but has yet to elaborate ways for traditional outsiders
to participate meaningfully in collaborative governance regimes. Cause
lawyers, then, might be faced with the challenging task of contesting
outcomes that have the imprimatur of a collaborative, consensus-building
process. Consequently, cause lawyers might instead opt for continued rights-
claiming litigation, which may secure additional entitlements and legitimate
a group's inclusion claims. 8 2 In this sense, successful rights-claiming
litigation might, in some ways, be a necessary but not sufficient condition
for successful New Governance practice.
IV. NEW GOVERNANCE INTERVENTIONS IN IDENTITY-BASED CONTEXTS
In this Part, I offer three examples of New Governance interventions in
identity-based contexts. In different ways, these three case studies illustrate
the problems with New Governance application identified in the previous
Part. They demonstrate that some cause lawyers resist New Governance
systems that do not include them and react against vague and
underdeveloped roles offered by New Governance programs. Moreover,
these examples show that New Governance process may merely reproduce
existing power differentials and leave traditionally disempowered groups
and individuals with little substantive gain and increasingly less room for
public contestation.
180 Indeed, Joel Handler has noted this in the social movement law-reform context,
regardless of New Governance thought. See id. at 39.
181 Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes, supra note 11, at 331. See also Scheuerman,
supra note 26, at 118 ("it might turn out that greater equality is necessary for democratic
experimentalism to work in the first place").
182 As William Simon concedes, "[tihe most collaborative negotiation will
necessarily be influenced by the participants' assumptions about the background rights of
the participants, rights Legal Liberals may be better equipped to define and debate than
Legal Pragmatists." Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 212.
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More generally, these examples profoundly question the claim that New
Governance offers a paradigm shift in public problem solving. Rather, the
failure of New Governance in certain circumstances at least situates New
Governance as a contingent model of cause lawyering that complements,
rather than replaces, traditional public interest law practice. Indeed, litigation
continues to offer a profitable way for marginalized groups to secure
substantive benefits and to publicly challenge the status quo. In addition, by
elaborating conditions that complicate New Governance practice, these case
studies suggest challenges that New Governance theory must face as
scholars and practitioners take up new projects and enter additional domains.
A. The First Amendment Center's Guide, "Public Schools and Sexual
Orientation"
The First Amendment Center works with schools and communities and
relies on consensus documents to deal with contested issues while protecting
important First Amendment freedoms. 183 The First Amendment Center
enjoys a proven track record in producing frameworks that help schools and
communities deal with contentious religious issues; national NGOs
(including public interest law firms), religious organizations, and the federal
Department of Education have endorsed its guides.
In 2006, the First Amendment Center released its guide for schools,
"Public Schools and Sexual Orientation: A First Amendment Framework for
Finding Common Ground" (the guide). 184 The guide provides a process for
dealing with various issues most central to the intersection of sexuality and
religion in public schools, including student clubs, anti-harassment and anti-
183 See The First Amendment Center, The Bible & Public Schools: A First
Amendment Guide, at 15 (1999), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
PDF/bibleguidegraphics.PDF [hereinafter The Bible & Public Schools]. The First
Amendment Center is funded by the Freedom Forum, "a nonpartisan foundation
dedicated to free press, free speech and free spirit for all people." Id.
184 See The First Amendment Center, Public Schools and Sexual Orientation: A
First Amendment framework for finding common ground (2006), available at
http://www.furstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/sexual.orientation.guidelines.PDF [hereinafter
Public Schools and Sexual Orientation]. The information about the First Amendment
Center process in this Part comes from my interviews with Dr. Charles Haynes of the
First Amendment Center and Wayne Jacobsen of BridgeBuilders. I am grateful for their
time and insights. While I criticize aspects of the frameworks they employ, I applaud
their efforts to bring discussions of sexual orientation into potentially resistant
communities, to open up a dialogue between social conservatives and progressives, and
to work toward an environment in which all students feel safe.
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discrimination policies, curriculum, and free speech. 85 The guide represents
a collaboration between the Christian Educators Association International
(Christian Educators) and the Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network
(GLSEN) and was facilitated by Dr. Charles Haynes of the First Amendment
Center with the help of Wayne Jacobsen of BridgeBuilders.'
8 6
1. Principles
The guide emphasizes five bedrock New Governance principles, each of
which I will briefly address.
a. A Turn Away from Adversarial Win-Lose Scenarios and Litigation
After noting that "[c]onflicts over issues involving sexual orientation in
the curriculum, student clubs, speech codes and other areas of school life
increasingly divide communities, spark bitter lawsuits, and undermine the
educational missions of schools,"'187 the guide specifically moves away from
a litigation framework. Rather than adhere to the perceived current approach,
in which "[a]dvocacy groups on both sides are working hard to promote their
185 See id. at 2 (referring to "sexual orientation in the curriculum, student clubs,
speech codes and other areas of school life"). It is important to note that the process
advocated by the First Amendment Center is not merely a mediation process, although it
resonates with thinking on mediation and negotiation. Haynes and Jacobsen are not
mediators, and Jacobsen is careful to note that he is a facilitator. Telephone Interview
with Wayne Jacobsen (April 14, 2008) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Jacobsen
Interview]. As scholarship on mediation and negotiation makes clear, many in the field
stress "a mediator's active participation," including "active insertion... in the conflict,
and active guidance of the parties toward agreement." Russell Korobkin, Psychological
Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
281, 327 (2006). Jacobsen, on the other hand, emphasizes that he seeks to empower
community members to conduct their own process. Jacobsen Interview, supra.
186 Public Schools and Sexual Orientation, supra note 184, at 1. BridgeBuilders
facilitates collaborative decision-making processes in local communities. It opens its
website with the following statement: "In a world where angry voices serve their agendas
as the only just cause, where people demand their rights at the expense of others and
where our institutions are satisfied with narrow-margin victories that are easily
overturned when the winds of power shift, how can a community avoid angry
polarization? Facing divisive issues [such] as religion in schools and policies regarding
sexuality, schools and communities end up in deep conflict or litigation, resulting in
court-ordered 'solutions' that satisfy no one." BridgeBuilders, http://www.bridge-
builders.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2008).
187 Public Schools and Sexual Orientation, supra note 184, at 2.
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perspective in the schools,"'' 88 the guide instructs that "[i]f schools are going
to win the peace, it will not be by choosing a side and coercing others to
accept it.' '189 While advocacy and adversarialism compel schools to choose
sides, which "only provokes more conflict and solves nothing,"' 90 the guide
focuses on collaborative decision making to reach solutions that all
community members can embrace. In turning away from nationalized win-
lose scenarios and toward localized win-win situations, the guide explains
that "[c]ivil local discussions that lead to solutions are less costly, less
divisive, and more effective than lawsuits or shouting matches in the
media."191
b. A Focus on Fair Process
The guide is almost completely silent on actual content, instead
emphasizing process as a means of illuminating substance. Advocating "a
process of deliberation that is open and fair,"' 92 the guide states that "[i]t is
possible.. . to find areas of agreement if school officials create a climate of
mutual respect and honest dialogue."' 93 To this end, it urges schools to create
a "common ground task force" consisting of community members
representing a range of perspectives. 94 With proper ground rules, "all sides
come to the table prepared to seek a greater common good."'195 The guide
sees substance emerging from good process: "By building relationships
among people with opposing views, the task force builds trust and mutual
respect that can translate into shared agreements on school policy and
practice.
'' 96
c. Stakeholder Inclusion
The guide urges school officials to "[i]nclude all stakeholders,"
encouraging such stakeholders to "[t]hink outside the box of 'us vs. them'
188 Id.
18 9 Id. at3.
190OId.
191 Id. at 5.
192 Id. at4.
193 Public Schools and Sexual Orientation, supra note 184, at 3.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
[Vol. 70:2
WHEN NEW GOVERNANCE FAILS
politics. 197 More specifically, it is necessary to "includ[e] all of the
stakeholders in the effort to develop policies that promote fairness for all and
practices that can be widely supported., 198 Such stakeholders must represent
"a wide range of community views."' 99 The guide locates schools as "honest
brokers of a dialogue that involves all stakeholders and seeks the common
good., 200 The inclusion of diverse stakeholders serves as a vehicle to move
outside of one-sided advocacy discourse, as the guide contends that "[p]olicy
decisions about issues concerning sexual orientation should be made only
after appropriate involvement of those affected by the decision and with due
consideration for the rights of those holding dissenting views."20'
d. Public-Private Partnerships
Rather than locate schools within the realm of advocacy,2 °2 the guide
situates schools as facilitators of fair, measured policymaking with an eye
toward "serv[ing] the entire community., 20 3 As honest brokers, schools have
a distinct institutional role to foster participation and solutions. More
concretely, the guide advocates a "common ground task force" which would
advise the school board on a range of issues, thus giving community
members some capacity in policy formation.204 Transparency is also a value
key to the idea of public-private partnerships; as the guide instructs, schools
must "talk openly about these issues," rather than "seek to avoid controversy
by trying to fly under the radar when dealing with this complicated issue. 2 °5
e. Local Experimentation
In its tips for school officials, the guide instructs administrators to
"[a]ssure parents and students that the school district will listen carefully, be
fair to all parties, and try hard to avoid choosing sides in the broader national
197 Id. at 4.
198 Id. at 3.
199 Public Schools and Sexual Orientation, supra note 184, at 3.
200 Id. at2.
201 Id.
202 See id. at 4 ("[a]dvocacy groups play an important role in a democracy.., public
schools have a very different role").
203 Id.
204 Id. at 3.
205 Public Schools and Sexual Orientation, supra note 184, at 5.
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conflict., 20 6 The guide instructs community members to "strive to keep your
community discussion a local one. 20 7 While it acknowledges that "outside
groups and individuals [can] be helpful facilitators or resources, and
[include] some perspectives that are important to the discussion [but] may
not be well represented in your community," the guide also stresses that
"neighbor-to-neighbor dialogue works best when a local disagreement
doesn't become a national controversy., 20 8 In addition, it recognizes the
policy variations that may occur from state to state as groups work with
background laws setting default positions and possibilities. As the guide
acknowledges, "[t]he laws of each state (which vary widely and change
frequently) are both the starting point and framework for addressing sexual
orientation in local schools. 20 9
2. Professional and Representational Challenges
a. Lawyer Uptake
This section shows how a lack of lawyer uptake posed substantial
problems for the implementation of the guide's New Governance strategy.
In its school governance guides, the First Amendment Center seeks to
bring on board a mix of national legal, religious, and education groups. A
range of organizations has found common ground in previous non-litigation
efforts facilitated by the First Amendment Center in the religion context. For
instance, various education NGOs and unions, as well as legal organizations
such as the Christian Legal Society (CLS) and the Anti-Defamation League
(ADL), expressly endorsed the Bible guide,2 10 and the ACLU later promoted
it extensively.2 1  Dr. Charles Haynes, who spearheaded the sexual-
orientation-focused guide, modeled it on these other agreements,21 2 but
replicating the process used in the purely religious domain in the sexual
206 Id.
207Id
208 Id.
2 09 Id. at 3.
210 The Bible & Public Schools, supra note 183, at 16.
211 See Statement on The Bible in Public Schools: A First Amendment Guide,
American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/religion/schools/
29618res20070509.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
212 For instance, the First Amendment Center's guide on the role of religion in
public school curricula proved extremely useful, and numerous schools have used it to
filter out courses that would be unconstitutional under Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
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orientation context proved especially difficult. According to Haynes, past
agreements were built on trust and a small network of repeat players, but no
such similar starting point existed in the sexual orientation context.213
Haynes first approached GLSEN, an education-focused lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) organization, which he found to be
receptive. Next, Haynes considered how best to include conservative
Christian groups in the drafting process. Comparing the issue to the
evolution/intelligent design debate, Haynes believed that some evangelicals
would fault members merely for participating in a meeting on the topic,
especially one with GLSEN, a group thought of as part of a "homosexual
agenda." He first approached Christian Educators, a relatively small group,
but one that represents conservative Christians working in the public
schools. Haynes thought that Christian Educators would likely be more
receptive than some of the other national Christian groups, having seen
through the organization's service on a religion advisory committee in
California that the group wanted a place at the table and worked effectively
with diverse stakeholders. The leader of Christian Educators, himself a
former superintendent of schools, committed to join the drafting process. As
the process continued, Haynes convinced two national, non-partisan
education organizations to join the consortium: the American Association of
School Administrators (AASA) and the Association for Supervision and
Curriculum Development (ASCD).
At this point, modeled on his efforts in the past, Haynes invited other
groups to join. He made the decision to reach out to conservative Christian
groups first. When Haynes approached Christian public interest law firms,
he found unyielding resistance. In his view, the increased litigation posture
of these groups makes their involvement in negotiative, non-litigation
processes more difficult. While Haynes never received an explicit rejection
from the Christian Legal Society (CLS), which had joined the First
Amendment Center's religion guides, the group ultimately did not join.214
While CLS was at one point more of a litigation avoidance actor committed
to negotiated pre-litigation resolutions, Haynes has seen it become less
interested in such strategies. Similarly, the American Center for Law &
213 See Telephone Interview with Dr. Charles Haynes, Senior Scholar, First
Amendment Center (Feb. 29, 2008) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Haynes
Interview].
214 A similar implied rejection came from the National Association of Evangelicals.
See id.
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Justice (ACLJ) did not sign on, explaining that the group's constituents
would not likely support endorsement of the guide.2 5
Without having Christian legal organizations sign on, Haynes made the
decision to release the document as quickly as possible. He worried that if he
waited and attempted to make inroads with Christian groups, Christian
Educators would back out, thus leaving no endorsement by a conservative
Christian group. This concern was particularly acute given Christian
Educators' ties to CLS, which provides the group with legal advice. Haynes
released the guide, deciding that with the two lead education groups-
Christian Educators and GLSEN-he could promote it.
Notably, no gay rights or left/progressive legal organization explicitly
endorsed the guide.
b. The Absence of Lawyers and Legal Norms
The previous section demonstrated that the guide's framers sought the
endorsement of legal organizations. Realizing how influential cause lawyers
are in the implicated movements, the framers attempted to gain their
approval. Yet at the same time, as this section shows, lawyers were excluded
from the process, and such exclusion might have contributed to their lack of
endorsement.
The guide explicitly urges community members and school officials not
to include outside advocates. Charles Haynes does not see a place in local
community disputes for legal groups.216 Likewise, Wayne Jacobsen rejects
outsider involvement, instead advocating the inclusion only of facilitators
and local community members. In fact, he believes any individuals subject to
political pressures and needing to answer to constituents-including at times
school board members and lawyers-are detrimental to the process.
Jacobsen sees the removal of political accountability as a way to shift the
focus from a process where individuals are devising how to fund a lawsuit
and media campaign to one with principled dialogue and shared solutions.21 7
In a way, the same impulse against litigation and conflict that drives the New
Governance intervention keeps the process and its backers from including
lawyers and articulating cause lawyer roles.
The guide moves away from litigation in a domain in which litigation is
pervasive. In explaining the ACLU's reluctance to sign on explicitly to
consensus guides from the First Amendment Center, Jacobsen notes that
215 E-mail from Dr. Charles Haynes, Senior Scholar, First Amendment Center, to
author (April 27, 2008) (on file with author).
216 See Haynes Interview, supra note 213.
217 See Jacobsen Interview, supra note 185.
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signing on would compromise the ACLU lawyers' ability to litigate; they
would not want to initiate litigation only to see an opposing group undercut
the ACLU's effort by pointing out that the group signed on to a document
effectively rejecting litigation.218 Of course, this is not to say that such cause
lawyers do not engage in non-litigation strategies; rather, the displacement of
litigation by a comprehensive, formalized non-litigation strategy in this area
might reduce lawyers' ability to move between strategies and to preserve a
pure advocacy role.
Moreover, the guide lacks legal baselines or substantive commitments.
This renders cause lawyer uptake more unlikely, especially since the guide
concerns highly contested issues. It is less law-oriented than the First
Amendment Center's other guides, which focus more on established legal
principles in the religion domain and thereby present a less contested picture.
Noting a trend among Christian legal groups which finds them more likely to
sign on to guides centered on legal norms, Jacobsen believes that given that
the guide focuses more on process than on law, legal groups are reluctant to
endorse it.
219
The First Amendment Center's New Governance intervention devalues
the roles that gay rights and Christian Right cause lawyers emphasize and at
which they excel, yet it does so in the context of movements that are fairly
law-centered and lawyer-dominated, such that the deployment of lawyers is
intimately tied to each movement's success. Intervening with a framework
that devalues these lawyers' strengths fails to sell the promise of
collaborative governance to some of the actors most necessary to its
successful uptake. These lawyers evidence significant strengths in roles vital
to New Governance yet neglected or minimized by current New Governance
thought. Two of these roles relate to the issues of representation and
expertise discussed in Part II.A, supra.
Cause lawyers for the gay rights and Christian Right movements have
made careers of representing potentially marginalized groups and forcing
official decision makers to take seriously the claims and interests of such
groups. A process that discounts that role and instead compels constituents
to frame and articulate their own interests might, perhaps counterintuitively,
make citizen participation less likely and might facilitate the continued
marginalization of outsider voices. Participation in democratic decision
making requires citizens to voluntarily voice interests in a public forum;
citizens not schooled in public participation might resist such participation,
218 See id.
219 See id.
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especially when their perspectives are considered unpopular.22 ° If included,
professional social movement lawyers could facilitate involvement of
outsider groups and represent marginalized perspectives.
Furthermore, the guide fails to look to the expertise offered by cause
lawyers in this domain, instead leaving deliberation of complicated issues
solely to local participants. School-based litigation, however, suggests that
attorney expertise up front on doctrinally complex and politically sensitive
issues may avoid later litigation and actually defuse adversarial interactions.
Litigation in Ector County, Texas regarding the school district's Bible
course provides an illustration. The Director of Litigation of the ACLU's
Program on Freedom of Religion and Belief commented that in light of the
litigation and settlement agreement, the school officials now have a better
understanding of what is constitutionally permissible.22' Indeed, the
settlement agreement itself created "a clear roadmap if [the school] decides
to adopt a new course. 222 Had lawyers' expertise, both from a civil liberties
and a religious perspective, been present from the beginning stages of
curricular development, perhaps the school could have avoided a lawsuit.
Instead, the school district ushered in the controversial curriculum without
consultation.
Lawyers can bring expertise to school districts and community members
at the level of policy formation. The First Amendment Center's guide
explains that different legal norms regarding sexual orientation will provide
different baselines and frameworks for the local deliberative process. Here,
then, is an opportunity for the process framers to construct a role for cause
lawyers who are clearly expert in the state of the law regarding sexual
orientation and to bring expert lawyers in at the outset.
c. The Leap to Substance
While the two previous sections focused on lawyer inclusion, this
section looks to substantive possibilities offered by the New Governance
process.
The guide does not make specific content recommendations, but rather
suggests that a process based on "trust and mutual respect ... can translate
into shared agreements on school policy and practice. 223 It offers little
220 See Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 175.
221 See ACLU Successfully Helps Parents Challenge Bible Classes in Texas Public
Schools, American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/religion/schools/
bibleinpublicschools.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
222 Id.
223 Public Schools and Sexual Orientation, supra note 184, at 3.
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concrete instruction on how and provides no suggestions as to what these
shared agreements might look like.
Moreover, with a movement/countermovement relationship
characterized by distrust, the process itself seems to run counter to the
current strategies of both movements. In fact, Wayne Jacobsen explains that
Christian Educators and GLSEN both "paid a price" with their respective
movements for their involvement in the First Amendment Center's effort.
224
In the aftermath of the press conference announcing and disseminating the
guide, Christian Educators received criticism from various conservative
groups as well as its constituents. Perhaps the comments of Christian
Educators' leader, Finn Laursen, evidence this pushback. Laursen's tone
sounded materially different than that of Haynes and GLSEN, commenting
that his group's "endorsement of the guidelines ... is in no way a wandering
away from, change or compromise of our long established support of
traditional family values and Biblical standards., 225 Furthermore, Laursen
framed the guide more as a way to prevent school districts from pushing
forward pro-gay positions without parents or Christian advocates knowing,
explaining that "emotions escalate when not all stakeholders are included
from the onset and the issues surrounding homosexuality come in 'under the
radar.' 226 To Laursen, the guide facilitated input from the outset as a means
of cutting off the advocacy agenda of pro-gay groups.
Furthermore, lawyers, and their constituents, may be skeptical of a
system that promises common ground for two movements that often share
little in terms of normative commitments and policy goals. In this
environment, seemingly uncontroversial issues are politicized. For instance,
safety is the only content-based idea to which the guide points. The guide
explains that "[a]ll parents ... want schools to be safe learning environments
where no student is harassed or bullied for any reason," and that "most
people will support policies that prohibit the mistreatment of any individual
or group and provide appropriate avenues for redress of grievances., 227 In
the currently polarized movement/countermovement environment, however,
even anti-bullying measures are identified with a particular ideological
orientation. For instance, in Massachusetts, social conservative advocacy
group MassResistance vigorously opposed an anti-bullying bill pending in
the state legislature. Acknowledging that "[b]ullying in schools can be a
224 See Jacobsen Interview, supra note 185.
225 See Press Release, First Amendment Center, 1st consensus guidelines offered for
schools on sexual orientation, Apr. 26, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
news.aspx?id= 16612 (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
226 Id.
227 Public Schools and Sexual Orientation, supra note 184, at 4.
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problem," the group nonetheless referred to "an 'anti-bullying' agenda" and
explained that "these particular types of programs were being pushed by the
homosexual lobby, and were mostly a front for pushing their agenda. 228
Similarly, Citizens for Community Values describes the issue of school
safety as a Trojan horse, used by advocacy groups to "delude" decision
makers "into adopting the pro-homosexual agenda., 229 The difficulty in
dislodging issues from adversarial relationships and broader ideological
contexts challenges New Governance assumptions about process and win-
win solutions.
B. The Montgomery County Citizens Advisory Committee
The First Amendment Center's guide represents a global, high-level
attempt to facilitate New Governance process at the local level. It is helpful
now to turn to one such local intervention, which derives from a dispute in
Montgomery County, Maryland. The Montgomery County School Board
initiated a plan to add three lessons to its health and sex education
curriculum for eighth and tenth graders. These lessons included issues
relating to sexual orientation, gender identity, condom use, and sexually
transmitted infection.23°
Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum (CRC), a local organization that
formed in response to the curricular changes, challenged the curriculum in
federal court. Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays and Gays (PFOX) joined
CRC, and Christian public interest law firm Liberty Counsel represented
both. The federal district court enjoined implementation of the curriculum. 231
CRC and PFOX challenged a revised curriculum, this time in the state
administrative system and state court, with representation by another
228 Victory and defeat: In unannounced session, Education Committee caves to
pressure-sends both pro-homosexual Planned Parenthood bill AND Parents'Rights bill
to "study "-effectively killing them, MASSRESISTANCE, Feb. 15, 2008,
http://www.massresistance.org/docs/gen/08a/prbillnews_021505.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2009).
229 See CITIZENS FOR COMMUNITY VALUES, THE LEGAL LIABILITY ASSOCIATED WITH
HOMOSEXUALITY EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, available at
http://www.ccv.org/downloads/pdf/LegalLiability_of_HomosexualityEducation.pdf.
230 Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
Opinion No. 07-30, at 2 (Md. St. Bd. of Educ. June 27, 2007), available at,
http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE/stateboard/legalopinions/ (follow
"ALPHABETICAL INDEX" hyperlink; then follow "Citizens for a Responsible
Curriculum, et al. v. Montgomery County Board of Education 07-30" hyperlink).
231 Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Schs., Case No.
AW-05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634 (D. Md. May 5, 2005).
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Christian public interest law firm, the Thomas More Law Center (TMLC).
Lambda Legal, a national LGBT legal organization, helped defend the
school district's curriculum by representing advocacy organization Parents,
Families, & Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) in an amicus curiae
capacity.
After the federal court granted a preliminary injunction against the
health curriculum (and before the second round of litigation), the parties
entered a settlement agreement that specified a collaborative process for
curricular revision.232 The Board of Education named new members to the
Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) on Family Life and Human
Development to review and revise the curriculum, make recommendations to
the Board, and oversee implementation. Although the settlement agreement
restructured CAC to include new stakeholders, the committee itself already
existed and helped design the first curriculum challenged in federal court.233
The idea of the committee accords with guidelines relating to sex education
in Maryland,234 showing that the state education department embraced a
collaborative process to develop sex education curriculum at a local level
rather than through specific state-wide mandates.
1. Principles
As with the First Amendment Center's guide, the process used in
Montgomery County resonates with five significant New Governance
themes, and I will briefly situate the model within these features.
a. A Turn Away from Winner-Take-All Litigation
Having emerged from a settlement agreement, the model represents a
literal turn away from continued litigation. The purpose of the process was
to consider various views on the curricular issues and to devise a curriculum
that reflected consensus and would not lead to additional litigation.
232 Memorandum from Jerry D. Weast, Superintendent of Sch., to Members of the
Bd. of Educ., Montgomery County Public Schs. 2 (Jan. 9, 2007) (on file with author),
available at http://www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org/info/pdf/BoardHealthEdpaperl-9-
07.pdf [hereinafter Weast Jan. 9 Memorandum].
233 See Memorandum from Jerry D. Weast, Superintendent of Schs., to Members of
the Bd. of Educ. (Nov. 9, 2004) (on file with author) (including CAC report on initial
revisions to health curriculum regarding condom use demonstration and sexual
orientation instruction).
234 See MD. CODE REGS. § 13A.04.18.03(D)(1) (2007).
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b. Stakeholder Inclusion
The 15 CAC members consisted of eight community members, including
parents, students, physicians, and healthcare professionals, and seven
members representing stakeholder organizations, including representatives
from CRC, PFOX, PFLAG, and Teach the Facts, a community group
supporting the initial curriculum.
235
c. Public-Private Partnerships
CAC was composed of a variety of community interests, including
private citizens representing themselves and individuals representing NGOs
and advocacy organizations. CAC members proposed changes to the
curriculum, which they presented to the superintendent and Board of
Education. CAC submitted two reports, which together proposed 83
changes.236 School district officials incorporated 69 of the 83 changes
recommended by CAC.237 CAC has a continuing role in overseeing field
testing, revision, and implementation. CAC and the Board of Education
looked to NGOs like PFLAG and GLSEN for guidance and expertise.238
d. Local Decision Making
CAC was chaired by a community member, Dr. Carol Plotsky, a leading
pediatrician and a former attorney.239 Local education experts assisted CAC
in its deliberations, including the school district's director of curriculum and
235 See Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Schs., Case
No. 284980, at 2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008); Weast Jan. 9 Memorandum, supra note
232, at 1-2; Letter from Regina Griggs, Executive Director of PFOX, to The Honorable
Nancy Navarro, President of Montgomery County Board of Education & Dr. Jerry West,
Superintendent of Montgomery County School District (Apr. 19, 2007) (on file with
author), available at http://www.mcpscurriculum.com/pdf/BOEPFOX_407
letter.pdf [hereinafter Griggs Letter].
236 Weast Jan. 9 Memorandum, supra note 232, at 2.
237 Daniel de Vise, Sex-Ed Plan Could Revive Heated Debate from 2005, WASH.
POST, Jan. 5, 2007, at B4.
238 See Letter from Michelle Turner, President, Citizens for a Responsible
Curriculum, to Dr. Jerry Weast, Superintendent, Montgomery County School District 4
(Dec. 12, 2006) (on file with author), available at http://www.mcpscurriculum.com/
pdf/MinorityReportFinalized.pdf [hereinafter Turner Letter].
239 Dr. Plotsky served previously both as the chair of the Shady Grove Adventist
Hospital's Department of Pediatrics and as Connecticut Assistant Attorney General. See
Weast Jan. 9 Memorandum, supra note 232, at 3.
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instruction.240 Four physicians recommended by the Maryland Chapter of the
American Academy of Pediatrics served as volunteer medical consultants. 241
All four medical consultants were residents of Montgomery County, and
three had children in the school system. 242 The curriculum that ultimately
emerged, which features a 90-minute lesson for eighth and tenth graders on
"Respect for Differences in Human Sexuality" as well as a 45-minute lesson
for tenth graders on condom use, largely represents the school district's
original work, whereas the previous curriculum had borrowed heavily from
materials used in a Canadian school system.243
e. Flexibility
Allowing for reflection, revision, and flexibility, the school district field
tested the lesson plans, and reported that 91% of the students involved had
received the parental permission required to participate in the field test.
244
Results from different schools were compared.245 In New Governance
thought, the pooling of information from local experiments allows peer
institutions to compare performance and learn from one another.246 As the
superintendent described, staff "analyzed feedback collected throughout the
field test and made minor revisions to the lessons to improve instruction. 247
The guidance for teachers was also revised.248 As the state superintendent
explained in denying the request for a stay against the field testing of the
240 Id.
241 Id. at 1.
2 4 2 Id. at3.
243 Id. at 4 ("Much of the new curriculum... was developed by MCPS as original
work, due in large measure to the ground-breaking steps by the Board of Education to
usher in this improvement in health education and the lack of suitable curriculum
materials for students nationally.").
244 See Memorandum from Jerry D. Weast, Superintendent of Sch., to Members of
the Bd. of Educ. 3 (June 12, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter "Weast June 12
Memorandum"].
245 See id. at 3.
246 See Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes, supra note 11, at 332.
247 Weast June 12 Memorandum, supra note 244, at 1.
248 Id. at 5 ("Professional development will be revised to address instructional
strategies for below grade level readers, emphasize the rationale for scripted lessons, and
provide application and problem-solving exercises to promote effective responses to
student questions in class.").
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revised curriculum, the purpose is "to identify problems and to decide how
to fix them.,
249
2. Professional and Representational Challenges
a. Lawyer Inclusion
This section briefly comments on the position of lawyers in the
Montgomery County process, which neither expressly included nor defined
roles for lawyers. A lawyer headed CAC but was valued not for her former
career as a successful attorney but instead for her current role as a doctor,
child health specialist, and community member. Moreover, the school
district's counsel and an attorney at a large law firm were available to
provide legal assistance, but the cause lawyers involved in the litigation that
yielded the process were not included. While PFOX and CRC had
representation on CAC, they were not joined by the public interest lawyers
representing them; such lawyers seemed to wait on the sidelines, eager to
reinstitute litigation as the process broke down. As an attorney representing
CRC and PFOX remarked after the state court's decision in favor of the
school district, "We're not going to get out of town or disappear. We're not
leaving.', 250 Cause lawyers representing their respective movements were
committed to working on the contentious issues addressed by CAC, yet the
New Governance process that sought to replace litigation made no effort to
include them in a meaningful way.
b. Moving from Process to Substance in a Movement/
Countermovement Setting
This section teases out the relationship between process impediments
and substantive outcomes. Instead of entering a process with lawyer
representation, stakeholders, including those from the LGBT and
conservative Christian communities, were expected to enter a collaborative
process premised on the idea that bringing the various community interests
249 Order of the Superintendent in Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v.
Montgomery Co. Bd. of Educ. 4 (March 7, 2007) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Order of Superintendent].
250 Thomas More Law Center, MD Judge Rules Illegal Gay/Erotic Curriculum OK
(Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.thomasmore.org/qry/page.tafid=20 (follow "Archives"
hyperlink; then follow "MD Jude Rules Illegal Gay/Erotic Curriculum OK" hyperlink)
(last visited April 22, 2008).
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into the process would yield programming accepted (if not endorsed) by all
parties. Of course, this proved not to be the case.
The CAC model became another tool in an ongoing adversarial process.
With distrust in Montgomery County running high, the fact that such process
emerged from contentious litigation made the task of cleaving it from an
adversarial setting even more challenging. While lawyers on the one hand
helped devise the CAC process, they were also quick to return to court after
the first round of the process played out and key stakeholders, including
CRC and PFOX, disengaged from the process when they did not approve of
the substantive results.
In many ways, the process itself replicated the adversarial interactions
that characterized the earlier litigation. One CAC member, in the words of
CRC's president, "left the committee in outrage over its outright bias in
favor of gays and exclusion of ex-gays. 25' While she presented her concerns
to the Board of Education, she faulted CAC for refusing to act on them.252 In
the end, CRC and PFOX, along with one other CAC member, submitted a
''minority report," detailing revisions not embraced by the majority of
CAC.253 No document emerged that had the approval of the entire
committee.
With key stakeholders' substantive commitments diametrically
opposed-e.g., GLSEN's focus on accepting gay identity and the innateness
of sexual orientation versus PFOX's endorsement of ex-gay status and
changing sexual orientation-the move from process to substance proved
impossible. Exploring the characteristics of two key stakeholder groups-
lesbians and gay men and conservative Christians-leads to a better
understanding of how movement/countermovement dynamics complicate
New Governance's focus on process and the leap to substance.
The gay rights movement and the Christian Right movement have a
contentious, well-publicized movement/countermovement relationship. Both
tend to focus on the segments of the other that evoke the most outrage from
constituents and that paint the other as extreme and destructive.254 For
251 Turner Letter, supra note 238, at 2.
252 See id.
253 Id.
254 Psychological work in negotiation theory is helpful here. Russell Korobkin
explains how attribution bias work shows that "when acts of others harm us, we are more
likely to conclude that 'they' are bad people who have acted with malice or indifference."
See Korobkin, supra note 185, at 302. This surely resonates with the gay rights/Christian
Right movement/countermovement narrative. Moreover, the attribution bias effect "can
be reinforced and deepened by a related bias known as 'naYve realism,"' in which "[w]e
believe that our understanding of the world is authentic... [and] if others do not agree
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instance, the gay rights movement's depiction of the Christian Right often
focuses on that movement's ties to ex-gay ministries, which urge lesbians
and gay men to change their sexual orientation. The Montgomery County
situation played into this depiction. PFOX, allied with CRC in challenging
the curriculum, represents "ex-gays," and accordingly endorses "conversion
therapy" for lesbians and gay men,255 seeing homosexuality as a condition
that can (and should) be changed, rather than as a stable orientation. The
process undertaken in Montgomery County gave PFOX stakeholder status,
including a PFOX representative on CAC. This resonates with the New
Governance "presumption of inclusion. 256 The process was trusted to weed
out illegitimate claims and interests. Indeed, the process produced a
curriculum that excluded PFOX's views.
PFOX complained that other CAC members were openly hostile to its
position, claiming that "three of the CAC members showed outright
disrespect and intolerance of the ex-gay community," including an episode in
which a Teach the Facts member compared PFOX to "the Klan and child
molesters. 257 At the same time, gay rights groups resisted open
collaboration (and potential compromise) with a group that calls for rejecting
one's gay identity and thereby perpetuates the sexual shame in gay and
lesbian youth that the curriculum in Montgomery County is designed to
combat. Lesbians and gay men may experience dignitary harm in
acknowledging PFOX's position as potentially legitimate; even if a
collaborative process selects out PFOX's position, the mere inclusion of
PFOX might signal such legitimacy.
The focus on extreme positions found in the other movement might
make sense from movement organizing and publicity perspectives. For
instance, focusing on the ex-gay movement produces outrage in lesbian and
gay constituents and helps construct the public image of the Christian Right
as anti-gay, irrational, and out of touch with mainstream medicine. But from
a collaborative governance perspective, this move bolsters the claim that the
two movements share no substantive common ground. In this sense, firmly
with our view of the world or our view of facts, then they must be misinformed, biased,
insensitive, or self-interested." See Id. at 302-03.
255 See Parents & Friends of Ex-Gays & Gays, About,
http://www.pfox.org/about.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2009) (noting that "[n]ot all ex-gays
underwent reparative therapy," and discussing such therapy at length and contending that
"[n]one of the medical or scientific associations prohibit reparative therapy or any other
change therapy") (on file with author).
256 Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 210.
257 Griggs Letter, supra note 235, at 2.
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entrenched representational moves grounded in an adversarial model actually
undermine attempts at participatory process.
In addition, each movement may view a collaborative decision-making
process that relies on process norms to reach content solutions as simply too
risky. This relates both to ideas about the other movement and to perceptions
of inside decision makers.
First, lesbians and gay men and conservative Christians (or progressives
and social conservatives more generally) tend to view one another as
especially powerful. Social conservatives often portray lesbians and gay men
as affluent and as possessing inordinate political power.258 Even Justice
Scalia falls back on a caricature of the lesbian and gay population,
explaining in his dissent in Romer v. Evans that lesbians and gay men "have
high disposable income" and "possess political power much greater than
their numbers, both locally and statewide., 259 Similarly, pro-gay and
progressive advocates tend to perceive conservative Christians as
particularly powerful.26°
Social movement scholars have shown that a turn toward courts and
away from majoritarian or negotiative routes makes sense when a group
lacks political power (or perceives a relative lack of political power).26' This
insight suggests that both groups might have reasons, based both on
perception and reality, to resist collaborative decision making and to hew to
court-centered strategies.
Next, both groups doubt the legitimacy of school decision making. Gay
rights groups are skeptical of majoritarian politics. They might view schools
as subject to majoritarian pressures that dismiss sexual orientation issues in
light of the presence of impressionable, politically sensitive, presumptively
2 5 8 See JAMES W. BuTroN, BARBARA A. RENZO, KENNETH D. WALD, PRIVATE
LIVES, PUBLIC CONFLICTS: BATTLES OVER GAY RIGHTS IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 196
(1997).
259 517 U.S. 620, 645-46 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260 See BUTTON ET AL., supra note 258, at 150 (documenting gay rights issues in
local communities, the authors note that a school official in Cincinnati revealed his belief
that religious conservatives possess "'more power than they should have, given their
numbers').
261 See HANDLER, supra note 96, at 22 ("Courts have always been used by those
who find the balance of political forces against them."); Michael McCann & Jeffrey
Dudas, Retrenchment... and Resurgence? Mapping the Changing Context of Movement
Lawyering in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra
note 5, at 37, 50 ("The mobilization of law is... often a useful way for groups that are
disadvantaged by the majoritarian political process to access and leverage the power of
the state on behalf of their interests.").
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non-sexual (or at least heterosexual) children.262 On the other hand,
conservative Christians, seemingly in conflict with the majoritarian fears of
the LGBT community, might view schools as governed by an elite
professional class, guided by secularism and liberal politics. 263 As Christian
public interest law firm ACLJ explains, "the public educational
establishment increasingly embraces liberal ideology and secularism,
sometimes to the point of hostility against religion, particularly
262 See Letter to John Coyne, Chairperson, Portland School Committee, from Jay
Alan Sekulow, Chief Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice at 2 (Nov. 2, 2007)
(in a demand letter to the Portland, Maine school board to stop a contraception
availability program, ACLJ appeals in its statement of facts to one community member's
reaction that "'[w]e are dealing with children .. . I am just horrified at the suggestion"').
263 Conservative Christians might be rightly concerned about insider bias against
them. A recent study conducted by the Institute for Jewish and Community Research
found a bias among faculty members in higher education against Evangelicals. Alan
Cooperman, Is There Disdain For Evangelicals In the Classroom?, WASH. POST, May 5,
2007, at A3. Of the respondents, 53% admitted unfavorable feelings toward
Evangelicals, the most by far for any religion. See id. David French, the director of
ADF's Center for Academic Freedom, explained in the Christian press that the study
shows "an overwhelming ideological bias that manifests itself in concrete ways." Mark
Bergin, Tenured bigots: most faculty members don 't like evangelicals and aren't
ashamed to admit it, FREE REPUBLIC (Aug. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1880406/posts. Another commentator in the
Christian press explained: "The ideological chasm that increasingly divides the academic
elite from the larger culture is in full view here. Many academics, by their own
admission, look down upon Evangelical students, evangelical [sic] churches, and
Evangelical citizens." Audrey Barrick, Survey Suggests University Faculty Bias Against
Evangelicals, GOSPEL HERALD (May 9, 2007), available at
http://www.gospelherald.net/Article/education/19767/survey-suggests-university-faculty-
bias-toward-evangelicals.htm. Insiders maintain that such bias does not manifest itself in
the classroom. For instance, William Harvey, vice president of diversity and equity at the
University of Virginia, commented that it might not be "fair to make the leap... that this
is manifested in some bias in the classroom" and explained that when he was at the
American Council on Education, he did not see any "serious" incidents in which a
Christian student was subject to discrimination. See Cooperman, supra, at A3.
Evangelicals, of course, would disagree. While this empirical work focuses on higher
education, Wayne Jacobsen's observations about his involvement in communities
working through religion and sexuality issues underscore this phenomenon in secondary
education. He explained that the communities where these issues explode most frequently
are generally conservative communities that have become "bedroom" communities (or
commuting suburbs) for larger urban areas; long entrenched conservatives suddenly feel
like outsiders to the increasingly liberal and secular individuals settling in the community
and view school administrators as hostile to religious ideals and worldviews. Jacobsen
Interview, supra note 185.
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Christianity. ' '264 Cause lawyers, then, might have significant reasons for
eschewing what they perceive as parent- or school-driven governance in
favor of rights protection by the judiciary.
c. Interest Representation
Having explored difficulties with process engagement, this section
focuses on the prospect of sham process and the continued marginalization
of outsider interests.
First, CAC enjoyed limited power to influence official decision makers.
In responding to decisions of the school district's curriculum committee and
needing its proposed changes to be ratified by the school board, CAC
entered the process in a position that was in some ways reactive and limited
in its power to change predetermined positions. The participatory model
might represent a mere rhetorical commitment to listen to the community
members or might give these stakeholders some influence but no real
decision-making power.265 That is, government bodies, like the Board of
Education, may decide to cede no real power and instead maintain the option
of ignoring decisions made at community-led meetings.266 Members of CAC,
particularly CRC and PFOX representatives, might feel that the purported
community representation embodied by the process was "purely nominal. 267
Next, CAC itself might have only nominally acknowledged outsider
perspectives and might have been subject to capture by entrenched pro-gay
interests in Montgomery County. As with the "governance feminism"
phenomenon discussed in Part III.B., supra, a similar phenomenon might
occur in the gay rights context. CAC produced a curriculum favored by pro-
gay groups. While groups like PFLAG were included as stakeholders,
important non-partisan stakeholders shared PFLAG's commitments. For
instance, PFOX noted that the CAC chair was a PFLAG donor. 268 As PFOX
argued to the Board of Education, this fact "lends even more credibility to
[its] legal argument that the recommendations of the advisory committee
were biased.,
269
264 American Center for Law & Justice, Education, http://www.aclj.org/
Issues/Issue.aspx?ID=2 (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
265 See Burris et al., supra note 21, at 49 (community policing context).
266 See id. at 52 (participatory budgeting context).
267 Id. at 51.
268 See Griggs Letter, supra note 235, at 3.
269 Id. In addition, PFOX noted that the former CAC chair was now on the board of
Metro DC PFLAG. See id. at 1.
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Moreover, just as Halley and her co-authors notice the way feminism
functions as expertise, curricular expertise in Montgomery County emerged
from gay centrist NGOs like PFLAG and GLSEN.270 The gay interest groups
had so firmly entrenched themselves that they had become impartial experts
on curricular issues; gay-based advocacy had come to appear neutral. The
official state position embodied a gay centrist orientation, making arguments
by religious interests increasingly peripheral.
d. Contesting Outcomes
Finally, this section considers a potentially serious effect of New
Governance process: with the guise of meaningful participation, such
process may shield results from scrutiny and thereby legitimate existing
power differentials. In this sense, the New Governance intervention may
actually make lawyers' jobs more challenging as administrative bodies and
courts conceptualize post-process litigation as contrary to democratic ideals.
This phenomenon played out in the Montgomery County litigation after
the curriculum was revised. The revision process, which included CRC and
PFOX, formed part of the basis for discrediting those same groups'
objections to the outcomes. For example, in its opposition to CRC and
PFOX's attempt to block field testing of the new curriculum, the Board of
Education noted that two of the petitioners were in fact members of CAC
and "actively participated in review" of the programming to which they now
object.271 Similarly, in denying CRC and PFOX's request for a stay, the state
superintendent noted that a stay would frustrate the hard work by CAC, of
which petitioners were a part.272 Finally, the state circuit court, in affirming
the state Board of Education's decision in favor of the school district, relied
in part on the CAC process. The court credited what it saw as meaningful
citizen participation and input from numerous medical experts who were
270 Compare Halley, supra note 169, at 340 (describing "the elaboration of feminist
expertise about gender policy ranging from home economics to reproductive policy to
educational reform, and... the formation of [NGOs] and special offices designated to
the production and consumption of this expertise in policy and law settings across our
legal landscape") (emphasis in original) with Turner Letter, supra note 238, at 4, 6
(objecting that some of the curricular materials, published by a major educational
publisher, "are derived from GLSEN-a gay advocacy group that is not scientifically
based," and objecting to the recommendation of PFLAG as an information resource).
271 See generally Montgomery County Public Schools Opposition to Petitioners'
Motion for Stay at 3 n. 1, Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Cty. Pub.
Schs. (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008) (No. 284980).
272 See Order of Superintendent, supra note 249, at 4.
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also community members.273 The process itself, which perhaps only
reinscribed existing power imbalances, contributed to the rationale for
upholding the curriculum.
The appearance of community and expert consensus made the
challengers appear undemocratic. In this sense, for Lambda Legal and other
gay rights organizations, participatory process is not necessarily beneficial in
and of itself but offers a mechanism for justifying curricular innovation on
democratic principles in communities with institutionalized pro-gay
thinking. For CRC and PFOX, the process only made contesting the results
of entrenched decision makers more difficult. Therefore, the process used in
Montgomery County (or advocated by the First Amendment Center) might
merely produce the same result that would exist in its absence, and yet might
render challenges to such results, whether through the courts or the political
process, more difficult and seemingly less legitimate.
For gay rights advocates, the New Governance process allowed them to
further entrench their position. But for Christian Right advocates, the
process merely shrouded and legitimated their marginalization in the
particular community. Therefore, for Christian Right advocates in
Montgomery County, it might make more sense to contest the results of the
school decision-making process in a public, third-party venue rather than
through the channels of local school governance, which some conservative
Christian parents might see as grounded in biased, incompatible views and
assumptions.
C. The Opt-In Project and Law Firm Diversity
In her work on a structural approach to private employment
discrimination, Susan Sturm celebrates the efforts of accounting giant
Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte), which she sees as undertaking a privatized
New Governance initiative responsive to judicially-created norms
surrounding employment discrimination. The firm's Women's Initiative
increased women's participation in the company, including their rates of
promotion and leadership roles, by creating a task force that investigated
reasons for gender disparities, addressed those disparities with concrete
policy changes, and then reviewed the results of the policy on an ongoing
basis. The entire process was imbued with a level of transparency so that
273 See Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Schs., Case
No. 284980 at 2-3, 9 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008) (explaining that CAC, consisting of
experts and citizens, reviewed the lessons and recommended changes, many of which
were adopted, and noting that medical experts residing in Montgomery County served as
consultants during the process).
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274hiring and promotion patterns were made clear and benchmarks were met.
Outside expert organizations advised Deloitte during the process.275 In just
four years, the percentage of female partners rose from eight to twenty-one
percent.276 The Women's Initiative at Deloitte represents a New Governance
success story in which a private firm addressed a public problem in an
innovative, flexible, and participatory way.
Legal scholars, gender advocates, and practitioners have increasingly
turned their attention to law firm diversity, particularly the promotion of
women. In law firms, the percentage of female associates stands at 44.1%
while that of female partners is a mere 17.3%.277 Focusing on this issue
tracks the private employment issues highlighted in the Deloitte example as
well as the faculty issue Sturm tackles in her ADVANCE study. Sturm
herself uses the issue of women at law firms as an example of second-
generation discrimination ripe for New Governance intervention.278 Indeed,
advocates working on women's representation and participation in large law
firms have looked to Deloitte, as well as other private firms in non-legal
industries, for examples of innovative solutions to gender diversity
problems.
Public agencies, private firms, and NGOs have all played roles in
addressing law firm diversity. First, the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) moved into the public intermediary role
urged by Sturm. Choosing law firm diversity as an information-gathering
opportunity, EEOC compiled and released a 2003 report detailing the
strikingly low partnership rates for women and minorities at large law
firms. 279 Echoing Sturm's focus on second-generation discrimination, the
report concluded that for "large, national law firms, the most pressing issues
have probably shifted from hiring and initial access to problems concerning
the terms and conditions of employment, especially promotion to
partnership. '280 The report explained that promotion to partnership "takes on
274 See Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 492.
275 Id. at 493, 499.
276 Id. at 498.
2 7 7 HELLER EHRMAN LLP, OPT-IN PROJECT, PROJECT REPORT 5 (May 31, 2007),
available at http://www.hellerehrman.com/docs/en/The%200pt%20In%20Report.pdf
[hereinafter OPT-IN PROJECT REPORT]. Women make up only 5% of managing partners at
large law firms. Id.
278 See Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 469-70.
279 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, DIVERsITY IN LAW
FIRMS 1 (2003), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/reports/diversitylaw/lawfirms.pdf
[hereinafter DIVERSITY IN LAW FIRMS].
280 Id. at 26.
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special meaning for women and minorities since the decision is often viewed
as being subjective and thus subject to non-relevant factors such as
race/ethnicity or gender.,
281
Next, public intermediaries' success depends on uptake and innovation
by private firms. Heller Ehrman LLP (Heller), a now-dissolved international
law firm, took the initiative on this end.282 Heller maintained a Gender
Diversity Committee, which pioneered the Opt-In Project (Opt-In), a
program that addresses the retention and promotion of women in law
firms.2 3 Heller was also part of the Bar Association of San Francisco's No
Glass Ceiling program, which sets benchmarks for firms regarding women in
management and partnership positions. 284 Through its initiatives, Heller
might have been acting, in New Governance terms, as a private
intermediary.285 Indeed, in its Opt-In work, Heller looked specifically to
Deloitte for guidance and included the head of Deloitte's Women's Initiative
in its deliberations. 86 Heller relied on research from Catalyst, the same firm
that advised Deloitte.287
Finally, NGOs provide information and advice to both public agencies
and private firms. For instance, EEOC recently heard testimony from
Professor Joan Williams of the Center for Work Life Law (WLL) at
Hastings College of Law. Williams works with employers and employees to
identify and eliminate family responsibilities discrimination, which she
defines as "discrimination against employees based on their obligations to
281 Id. at 27.
282 While I am critical of Heller's effort in this section, I acknowledge the firm's
willingness to act on the issue of diversity and recognize its initiative and progress
compared to other large firms. Of course, other firms are also taking up gender diversity
initiatives. In Chicago, for instance, the Bar Association's Alliance for Women started a
Call to Action initiative which uses the New Governance tool of benchmarking to
achieve greater gender equality in law firms. Large Chicago law firms signed on,
committing to increase the percentage of women partners and women in leadership
positions and to implement equitable flex-time policies. See Jenner & Block, Alliance for
Women Urges Chicago Firms to Augment Leadership Roles for Women (Jan. 26, 2005),
http://www.jenner.com/news/news-item.asp?print=true&id=12858324 (last visited Jan.
20, 2009).
283 Heller Ehrman, Diversity (on file with author).
284 The Bar Ass'n of San Francisco, Diversity Program, No Glass Ceiling,
http://www.sfbar.org/diversity/noglass-ceiling.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
285 See Sturm, Conclusion to Responses, supra note 123, at 422 (explaining that
"the capacity to perform [the] intermediary role is not limited to public funding agencies
and that it can be performed by very different kinds of public and private institutions").
286 OPT-IN PROJECT REPORT, supra note 277, at 7.
287 See id. at 9, 11.
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care for family members., 28 8 To address this issue, which Williams views as
endemic in law firms, she urged EEOC to "involv[e] all of the
stakeholders. 289
In addition, Williams worked with Heller, making the case that a law
firm's implementation of family-friendly policies can increase the number of
women in the firm.290 Other NGOs, including the Feminist Majority
Foundation and the Center of Leadership and Ethics, also advised Opt-In
participants.29'
1. Principles
As with the previous examples, I will briefly set out five New
Governance principles found in the response to the issue of women's
representation in law firms and specifically in Opt-In.
a. Facilitation by Public Agencies and NGOs
Sturm argues that EEOC should play a public intermediary role. The
agency can collect data and facilitate studies on particular problems, create
public dialogue about issues of discrimination, encourage private entities to
create innovative solutions, and bring together stakeholders to share
information and compare strategies. 292 Indeed, EEOC's lack of formal
enforcement power may provide an opportunity for the agency to fill a more
facilitative role.293
In the law firm diversity context, EEOC has used the information
gathered on EEO-1 forms to compile a comprehensive study of the
288 Statement of Joan C. Williams, Perspectives on Work/Family Balance and the
Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Laws, Apr. 17, 2007,
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/4-17-07/williams.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2009) [hereinafter Williams Statement].
289 Id.
290 See id. at 6. Before WLL, Joan Williams had previously spearheaded a report by
the Project for Attorney Retention (PAR), which was supported by the Sloan Foundation
and the Washington, D.C. Women's Bar Association. PAR attempted to compile best
practices for law firms regarding non-stigmatizing alternative work policies and released
a final report in 2001. See Project for Attorney Retention, Balanced Hours: Effective
Part-Time Policies for Washington Law Firms (2001), available at
http://www.pardc.org/Publications/BalancedHours2nd.pdf [hereinafter Balanced Hours].
291 See OPT-IN PROJECT REPORT, supra note 277, at 6, 10.
292 See Sturm, Workplace Equity, supra note 23, at 295.
293 See Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 550.
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representation and participation of women and minorities at large law
firms.294 EEOC has also brought in outside experts, such as Joan Williams,
to provide information and offer analysis, thereby opening up dialogue on
this issue and encouraging firms to act on policy initiatives advocated by
organizations like WLL.
NGOs, including expert organizations and quasi-public organizations,
also take a leading role compiling data on the well-being of women and
minorities in law firms and articulating problems relating to hiring, retention,
and promotion.295
b. Movement Outward to Private Firms
Private firms are essential partners in addressing workplace bias. The
organizations substantially responsible for the problem are trusted to engage
in a collaborative process to uncover causes and address disparities. Opt-In
is a paradigmatic example.
Public agencies and NGOs attempt to incentivize innovation by private
firms, recognizing those that have produced results and sharing best
practices.296 For example, EEOC started the Freedom to Compete Initiative
in 2005, which it describes as "an outreach, education, and coalition-
building strategy designed to complement the agency's enforcement and
294 See id. at 551 (noting that employers submit EEO-1 reports regarding hiring and
promotion patterns yet EEOC fails to analyze the data in a public, meaningful way).
295 For instance, the Equality Commission, a collaborative of the Massachusetts Bar
Association, the Boston Bar Association, and the Women's Bar Association,
commissioned a study by the MIT Workplace Center on the career trajectories of men
and women attorneys in large Massachusetts law firms. See Tricia Oliver, Study Reveals
Women's Struggles to Make Partner, LAW. J. (June 2007), available at
http://www.massbar.org/for-attomeys/publications/lawyers-joumal/2007/june/struggle-
for-women-attomeys-to-make-partner. The Equality Commission was spearheaded by
Hon. Nancy Gertner, a federal district judge in Massachusetts. See id. The report
concluded that "[w]omen leave the partnership track mainly due to the difficulty of
combining law finn work and caring for children in a system that requires long hours
under high pressure with little or inconsistent support for flexible work arrangements."
MIT WORKPLACE CENTER, WOMEN LAWYERS AND OBSTACLES TO LEADERSHIP 4 (Spring
2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/workplacecenter/docs/law-report_4-07.pdf.
Indeed, lawyers on flexible or part-time schedules, most often for caretaking reasons,
were less likely to be promoted to partnership than women not on such schedules. See id.
at 4-5.
296 See, e.g., Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 381.
2009]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
litigation programs. ' '297 To motivate firms to address glass ceiling issues and
law firm diversity, EEOC gives out Freedom to Compete Awards to
recognize "specific practices and concrete activities that produce results and
reflect an abiding commitment to access and inclusion in the workplace. 298
c. Stakeholder Collaboration
Law firm employees are encouraged to participate in a collaborative
process to explore and address gender and race disparities in law firm hiring,
retention, and promotion. This most often takes the form of a committee or
task force charged with assessing the problem and recommending solutions.
Public agencies, expert organizations, and bar associations also play roles in
the collaborative process.
d. Movement Away from Isolated Legal Disputes and Toward Holistic
Problem Solving to Address Second-Generation Bias
The causes of current patterns of participation are attributed to
institutionalized, often unnoticed, practices, rather than discriminatory
policies. The focus is not on overt discrimination but on institutionalized
bias, which is deemed less susceptible to rights-claiming litigation. 299 By
focusing on bias and culture, those addressing women's under-participation
in law firms reject portrayals of women as victims of intentional
discrimination and resist placing blame specifically on firm management. All
stakeholders are seen as having an interest in a better work environment that
values and retains women attorneys.
Furthermore, specific patterns interact to form a more comprehensive
picture of institutionalized bias.300 Unfavorable conditions for mothers relate
297 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Facts About the Freedom to
Compete Initiative, at http://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/compete/index.html (last visited
July 3, 2008).
298 Id.
299 Indeed, as a woman partner at a large Washington, D.C. law firm remarked,
"Law firms are way beyond discrimination-this is about advancement and retention.
Problems with advancement and retention are grounded in biases, not discrimination."
See Timothy L. O'Brien, Why Do So Few Women Reach the Top of Big Law Firms?,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006. This, of course, seems overstated, but the point is well-taken.
300 New Governance thought in a variety of domains suggests the benefits of
viewing problems in relationship to each other and as part of a larger picture. See, e.g.,
Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, supra note 48, at 888-89
(pointing to "integrated watershed management" to deal with an "entire suite of
problems").
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more generally to bias against women and bias against those with families.
Unreasonable work schedules disadvantage men just as they do women.3 1
Subjective decisions affecting assignments, client development, and
promotion result in the disparate treatment of both women and minorities.30 2
e. Transparency, Information Gathering, and Policy Revision
The first step toward acknowledging and addressing issues of under-
representation in law firms requires openness from firms, the uniform
collection of data, and the consistent collection and review of changing
information. 30 3 Opt-In materials are publicly available. Other firms can see
how Heller addressed issues of gender diversity and the recommendations it
made to deal with disparities. Firms are encouraged to share best practices.
While firms must increase transparency to reveal patterns of hiring,
retention, and promotion, public agencies and NGOs, including EEOC, state
bar associations, research institutes, and advocacy organizations, undertake
studies to compile and analyze the data. Continued analysis of new data
allows for reflection on policy initiatives and revisions toward greater
progress.
2. Professional and Representational Challenges
a. Framing (Legal) Problems
This section explores the way in which public and private actors
working on law firm diversity situate the issue as an institutional or cultural
problem, rather than as a law-based discrimination issue. The impulses
toward holistic assessments and privatized, organizational solutions obscure
points for more law-centered interventions.
First, those working on the issue of law firm diversity resist a
specifically gender-based framing of the situation, instead casting a wider
301 In her Deloitte example, Sturm notes how the "problem-solving process created
an immediate and direct focus for women's (and men's) concerns, which provided
incentives for collective action." Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 499.
302 See Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 184
(explaining that in New Governance practice "problems have a tendency to expand"); see
also Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 9, at 385-86.
303 See Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, supra note 11, at 192 ("an
important role of background institutions is both to develop metrics to facilitate the
comparison of data across institutions and to create incentives for these institutions to
make information available").
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net to frame the issue as a law firm employee problem regardless of gender.
For instance, Joan Williams states that "over 70 percent of men in their
twenties and thirties (in contrast to only 26 percent of men over 65) said, in
one study, that they would be willing to take lower salaries in exchange for
more family time. ''304 The tension in this balancing act is palpable; Williams
argues that "[m]ost women lawyers become mothers at some point in their
careers, and given that women are still responsible for a disproportionate
amount of the caregiving in our society, a firm that wants to attract and
retain women must address the needs of mothers - and fathers."3 °5 Similarly,
Opt-In constructs a picture in which both women and men would benefit
from restructuring the workplace in ways that recognize work/life balance
issues. °6
Next, advocates privatize the problem, appealing to market-based
incentives and firm-based solutions rather than to equality-based rationales
and public law-based solutions. Williams, for instance, appeals to law firms'
financial sense as much as to their sense of gender-based justice, making the
case that better work-family policies will help firms' bottom lines by
avoiding the costs of attrition.3 °7 Solutions are located within the walls of the
law firm as Opt-In relies on the efforts of law firm insiders. While outside
experts frame issues and provide recommendations, authority for
implementing solutions rests solely with the law firm itself, rather than with
NGOs, courts, or public agencies.
These framing techniques may obscure much of the actual problem. An
issue that might be viewed as gender discrimination and a public law
problem is instead characterized as a private workplace culture issue.30 8
304 OPT-IN PROJECT REPORT, supra note 277, at 9.
305 Balanced Hours, supra note 290, at 9.
306 See OPT-IN PROJECT REPORT, supra note 277, at 4.
307 See id. at 7.
308 See Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger, & John Lande, Internal Dispute
Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
497, 519 (1993) ("[I]nsofar as discrimination complaints stem from illegal
discrimination, the redefinition of legal issues in organizational terms tends to draw
attention away both from violations of law and from the class basis of discrimination.
Recasting legal issues in organizational terms deemphasizes and depoliticizes workplace
discrimination."); cf Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold
Court: Speculation on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REv.
941, 967 (1999) ("disputes that originate as rights violations ... are likely to be handled
as interpersonal difficulties, administrative problems, or psychological pathologies").
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Gender equity advocates and legal mandates appear largely irrelevant, and
cause lawyers from women's rights organizations are absent.30 9
b. Missed Rights-Claiming Opportunities
The non-legal framing mechanisms highlighted in the previous section
obscure potentially productive rights-claiming opportunities, which this
section addresses. New Governance problem solving to address certain
issues may be premature. The holistic lens of New Governance, which
attempts to aggregate various forms of discrimination and bias, includes
within its reach specific instances of explicit discrimination that might be
more effectively managed through straightforward rights claiming. Unequal
pay and maternal wall discrimination may fit well with a rights-claiming,
state-centered regulatory model of public interest advocacy, but instead these
issues are sacrificed to privatized solutions.
First, some firms pay part-time associates, who tend to be women, a
salary less than the proportionate amount of full-time salary, citing overhead
in most situations. NGOs working on this issue tell law firms that such
practices may provoke an Equal Pay Act (EPA) suit.310 For instance, in
presenting as part of Opt-In programming, Joan Williams and her colleague,
Linda Marks, pointed to potential legal claims under the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII. Williams noted that some firms expect part-time associates to
work 80% of a full-time schedule yet get paid only 65% of a full-time
salary.311 Although Williams and Marks cite Lovell v. BBNT Solutions,312 in
which a federal district court held that paying a woman chemist who worked
75% of a full-time schedule an effective pay rate lower than a male chemist
working a full-time schedule violated the EPA,3t 3 the EPA assertion in the
law firm context lacks clear legal mandates on its side. Most courts have
309 Cf Edelman & Suchman, supra note 308, at 970 ("The purported social benefits
of the in-house counsel movement center on legal professionals gaining access to the
corporate decisionmaking process, but giving lawyers more access does not necessarily
guarantee that they will use that access to promote external legal values. Thus, even the
apparently legalizing effects of in-house counsel offices may prove to be illusory:
preventive programs may produce compliance with the letter of the law while largely
vitiating the law's spirit[.]").
310 OPT-IN PROJECT REPORT, supra note 277, at 21.
311 JOAN WILLIAMS & LINDA MARKS, SOLVING THE PART-TIME PUZZLE (2006),
available at http://www.hellerehrman.com/docs/en/Opt-InProject HE-Powerpoint.ppt
[hereinafter SOLVING THE PART-TIW PUZZLE].
312 299 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Va. 2004); 295 F. Supp. 2d 611 (E.D. Va. 2003).
313 SOLVING THE PART-TIME PUZZLE, supra note 311.
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rejected claims by professional women, including lawyers, under the EPA.3 14
Instead, courts have allowed employers broad discretion when professional
or managerial positions are involved.315 Accordingly, the legal threat leveled
by advocates in this context is fairly empty in the current legal landscape.
Perhaps efforts at legislative reform to explicitly expand EPA coverage or
litigation urging courts to understand professional and managerial positions
within the EPA rubric offer more effective ways to help women receiving
pay that is less than proportional.316
Next, discrimination against women based on their status as mothers is
often explicit and straightforward, rather than taking a more subtle form of
bias that hinders women's professional advancement. 317 As Williams argued
to EEOC, "[i]t is 1970s style discrimination in the new millennium. ' '318 In a
variety of employment settings, courts have found discrimination under a
number of statutes, including Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), the EPA, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 319 As
Williams notes, "there is a sharply higher success rate in [family
responsibilities discrimination] cases than in other types of employment
314 See, e.g., Todd v. Blue Ridge Legal Servs., 175 F. Supp. 2d 857 (W.D. Va.
2001) (lawyer); Arthur v. Coll. of St. Benedict, 174 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Minn. 2001)
(professor); Campana v. City of Greenfield, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (city
treasurer). See also Juliene James, The Equal Pay Act in the Courts: A De Facto White-
Collar Exemption, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1873, 1873 (2004) (showing that "plaintiffs
bringing Equal Pay Act claims have faced courts whose interpretation of the law has
effectively excluded women in higher level positions").
315 See, e.g., Waters v. Turner, Wood & Smith Ins. Agency, Inc., 874 F.2d 797, 799
(11th Cir. 1989) (in denying claim of female employee in hybrid customer service
representative/insurance agent position, the court explained that the EPA "permit[s]
employers wide discretion in evaluating work for pay purposes"); Campana, 164 F.
Supp. 2d at 1090 (finding that city treasurer and comptroller were comparable,
"counterpart" positions but not "substantially equal" for purposes of EPA claim); see
also James, supra note 314, at 1886-89 (discussing relevant case law).
316 Recently, Congress has shown its willingness to pass equal pay reform,
approving legislation that overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 620, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007) (holding
that female employee did not meet filing deadline for Title VII claim because the 180-day
period started when she first received her paycheck, even though she was unaware of the
discrimination at the time). See also Editorial, Progress on Fair Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2009, at A30.
317 Williams Statement, supra note 288, at 3.
3 18 Id. at4.
3 19 Id. at7.
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discrimination cases.,,320 Lawsuits might move the ball forward, compelling
action by law firms seeking to avoid litigation and publicity. Research shows
that discrimination lawsuits may spur anti-discrimination efforts by the firm
subject to suit as well as other firms in the industry.32 ' Grouping this issue
with other law firm diversity issues obscures the presence of straightforward
discrimination and the potential for judicial remedies.
Sex discrimination complaints against law firms, then, might offer
powerful tools for change. Indeed, a sex discrimination charge against the
prestigious law firm of Boies, Schiller, & Flexner resulted in a favorable
determination by EEOC and a settlement. 22 Two associates claimed that the
firm created a two-tier system that pushed women into a non-partnership
track, and thereby discriminated against women with respect to
compensation and the terms of employment.323 EEOC determined that this
practice, which goes to the heart of much of the treatment that Williams
documents and the institutionalized bias that Opt-In seeks to address,
constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. 3 24 The outcome suggests the
administrative system's tolerance for such claims and points to ways in
which rights-claiming advocacy may become a mechanism for change in the
domain of law firm diversity.
I am not arguing here that litigation and New Governance problem
solving are necessarily mutually exclusive such that advocates must choose
one or the other. Instead, I am pointing out how as New Governance
occupies the space of law firm diversity rhetorically and with hard resources,
it renders litigation options peripheral. Indeed, as scholars situate New
Governance as a paradigm shift, the effectiveness and desirability of rights-
claiming litigation is called into question, and an all-or-nothing contest is
constructed. Instead, noticing the issues of straightforward discrimination
against women in the law firm setting and the potential for successful
litigation highlights the way in which New Governance should be framed as
a contingent model of cause lawyering that complements, rather than
displaces, other public interest law models.
320 Id.
321 Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Architecture of Inclusion: Evidence from
Corporate Diversity Programs, 30 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 279, 288, 295 (2007).
322 Determination, Baird, Porter v. Boies, Schiller, & Flexner LLP (EEOC 2003)
(Nos. 160-Al-1374, 160-Al-1375) (on file with author).
323 See id. at 1.
324 Id.
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c. Nominal Participation
This section turns away from missed law-centered opportunities and
toward the New Governance process itself, exploring the actual authority
granted to the relevant stakeholder organizations.
According to Sturm's description and publicly available information,
Deloitte's gender diversity program lacked mechanisms that gave the task
force decision-making authority or made its recommendations binding.
Instead, management, which Sturm describes as "initially skeptical," had to
take the issue and recommendations seriously and commit to enacting policy
changes in accordance with the findings of the committee.325 But we must
not gloss over this crucial step. What happens when a firm's management
committee fails to take seriously the findings of a diversity task force?
Heller's Gender Diversity Committee produced lengthy reports and
recommendations detailing the issues of women's low rates of retention and
promotion in Heller and other large law firms. Rather than vesting authority
in the Committee, though, Heller understood the Committee's role as
"provid[ing] input to management on best practices in these areas. 32 6 For
instance, Opt-In's recommendations were positioned as questions rather than
assertions, appearing under the heading, "Should Law Firms Consider[?]. 32 7
Here, the framers contemplated policies as expansive as flexible schedules
without identification of reasons and the provision of on-site childcare, as
well as changes as minor as the maintenance of bar memberships for
attorneys who have left the firm and the provision of telephones that roll
over to home or mobile lines.328
Opt-In did not have a mechanism that granted the Gender Diversity
Committee or Opt-In participants decision-making authority. Instead, even
after devoting substantial resources toward facilitating roundtables and task
forces that brought together law firm insiders, outside experts, and those
from other industries, Heller carefully framed the results as merely "ideas"
rather than mandates.329 Indeed, Heller went so far as to explain that the
325 Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 494, 492-96.
326 Heller Ehrman, Diversity, supra note 283.
327 OPT-IN PROJECT REPORT, supra note 277, at 16.
32 8 See id. at 21, 23, 24.
32 9 See Bagenstos, supra note 80, at 29 ("[M]anagement lawyers and consultants
have frequently urged employers to adopt internal dispute resolution procedures, zero-
tolerance policies, and diversity and sexual harassment training programs. These
responses serve the interests of employers by making them appear to be invested in
achieving workplace equality, and perhaps by promoting happier interpersonal relations
among workers. They also serve the interests of the intermediaries themselves, by
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policy recommendations generated "are not endorsed by any law firm,
including Heller Ehrman."3 0 Citing "client demands, market forces, and
socioeconomic influences," Heller noted that "some of these ideas [would
be] harder than others to put into practice in the near term (or ever). 33 1
Seemingly aware of its lack of authority, much of the guidance provided
to women at Heller by the Gender Diversity Committee lacked bite. For
instance, in its guide for women attorneys, Sharing What We Know, the
rhetoric seemed more fitted to rationalizing the current state of policies than
to thinking critically about moving forward. Women partners urged women
associates to benefit from their "humor and insight" rather than from binding
policies that speak to women's retention and promotion.332
Unsurprisingly, then, Heller did not approach the indicators of success
Sturm observed in her Deloitte and ADVANCE case studies. The percentage
of women partners increased only marginally: In Heller's self-reported
numbers taken from snapshots each year, the percentage of women partners
increased from just above 19% on February 1, 2006 to just below 23% on
February 1, 2008. 333 Significantly, during this time frame, Heller experienced
a one-person decrease in the actual number of women partners, which fell
from fifty-four to fifty-three.334 A report released by Working Mother and
promoting a market for their own services. But there is scant evidence that the responses
urged by intermediaries actually result in equal treatment or unbiased decisionmaking.").
330 OPT-IN PROJECT REPORT, supra note 277, at 14.
331 Id.
33 2 HELLER EHRMAN LLP, SHARING WHAT WE KNow: A RESOURCE FOR AND BY
HELLER EHRMAN WOMEN 1 (2005) available at http://www.hellerehrman.com/
docs/en/SharingWhatWeKnow.pdf ("This exercise made us truly proud to be a part of
Heller Ehrman and we hope you benefit as we did from the humor and insight of the
women of Heller Ehrman.").
333 To make these calculations, I used numbers provided by Heller to the National
Association for Law Placement (NALP), which publishes them in the NALP Directory of
Legal Employers. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW PLACEMENT, NALP DIRECTORY OF
LEGAL EMPLOYERS 133, 201, 268, 306, 508, 1167, 1695, 1730 (2008) [hereinafter 2008
NALP DIRECTORY]; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW PLACEMENT, NALP DIRECTORY
OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS 133, 192, 254, 291, 488, 1140, 1652, 1678 (2007) [hereinafter
2007 NALP DIRECTORY]; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW PLACEMENT, NALP
DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS 128, 190, 250, 286, 477, 1107, 1614, 1642 (2006)
[hereinafter 2006 NALP DIRECTORY]. After adding up the number of women partners
and women associates in all Heller domestic offices, I divided those numbers by the total
number of partners and associates, respectively, in those offices.
334 Heller had fifty-four women partners as of February 1, 2006, fifty-five women
partners as of February 1, 2007, and fifty-three women partners as of February 1, 2008.
See 2008 NALP DIRECTORY, supra note 333, at 133, 201, 268, 306, 508, 1167, 1695,
1730; 2007 NALP DIRECTORY, supra note 333, at 133, 192, 254, 291, 488, 1140, 1652,
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Flex-Time Lawyers in late 2007 generally confirmed this result, revealing
that women made up only 20% of partners at Heller.335 Furthermore, Heller
fared poorly in its retention of women associates: While the total number of
associates increased from 298 to 305, the number of women associates
decreased from 144 to 130.336 Heller's numbers compare poorly to Deloitte,
which boasted a 13% increase in women partners in four years, and an
increase in the actual number of women partners from 88 in 1993 to 246 in
1999. 311 In addition, Deloitte's attrition rates decreased significantly from
1995 to 1998.338
Heller dissolved in the fall of 2008 after the defection of key partners
prompted banks to call the firm's debt.339 Signs of trouble appeared earlier in
2008, however, when reports suggested that new management had changed
the culture to a more business-driven model that moved away from
rewarding employees for good citizenship and quality work and toward
rewarding them for bringing in business. 340 In the wake of its dissolution,
many Heller partners dispersed to other firms. 34 1 One such partner, an Opt-In
supporter, directly linked the business-driven direction of Heller to the
firm's demise. She saw Opt-In as a way to provide the psychological basis
necessary to unite such a large group of lawyers, lamenting the fact that
firms, including Heller, "focus[] a lot of attention on profits per partner"
when in fact "[p]eople are held together more by culture than by money., 342
1678; 2006 NALP DIRECTORY, supra note 333, at 128, 190, 250, 286, 477, 1107, 1614,
1642. It is worth noting that Heller maintained the same number of U.S. offices (eight) as
it experienced a decrease in the number of women partners.
335 See Suzanne Riss, Teresa Palagano, & Angela Ebron, Best Law Firms for
Women, WORKING MOTHER 67, 69 (2007), available at http://www.workingmother.com/
?service=vpage/797 (follow "Heller Ehrman LLP" hyperlink).
336 See 2008 NALP DIRECTORY, supra note 333, at 133, 201, 268, 306, 508, 1167,
1695, 1730; 2007 NALP Directory, supra note 333, at 133, 192, 254, 291, 488, 1140,
1652, 1678; 2006 NALP DIRECTORY, supra note 333, at 128, 190, 250, 286, 477, 1107,
1614, 1642.
337 Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 498. Sturm observed similarly
striking progress in her ADVANCE case study discussed in Part H.C., supra.
338 Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 498.
339 Baz Hiralal, 118-Year-Old Heller Ehrman Dissolves, Employees Left Searching,
THE DEAL.COM, Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.thedeal.com/dealscape/2008/10/118
yearoldheller-ehrmandisso.php.
340 Drew Combs, Stop-Loss, AMERICAN LAWYER, May 5, 2008, at 142, 147.
341 Hiralal, supra note 339.
342 Tom Abate, Woes that felled S.F. law firms shake industry, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1,
2008, at Al.
[Vol. 70:2
WHEN NEW GO VERNANCE FAILS
d. Interest Representation
Finally, this section shows how the interests most affected by the New
Governance intervention may lack real power or meaningful representation.
The issue of law firm diversity, and the representation of women more
specifically, casts private lawyers themselves as stakeholders. In this sense,
lawyers function as directly affected interests rather than as representatives,
experts, or advocates. Opt-In, for instance, relied on an internal stakeholder
collaboration to identify and redress problems affecting women lawyers.343
However, the process itself made women's own representation of their
interests exceedingly difficult. How can women associates, who might aspire
to career success at the firm, strongly advocate their positions to those who
determine their futures?344 Indeed, the women most wanting a career at the
firm are likely those most invested in the reform process, yet also most
constrained.
Sturm argues that in the Deloitte context, the group action of women, as
facilitated through the Women's Initiative, allowed women to voice
complaints that they would not otherwise feel comfortable voicing as
individual actors.345 But with relatively low numbers of women at some of
the nation's most prestigious law firms, and a paucity of women partners as
potentially sympathetic powerbrokers, the idea of group action might not
solve the problem in this new context.346 Women associates might
realistically worry that adverse action may result from their insistence on
more favorable policies. Without stature and power, women associates might
need outside advocates to serve their interests.
Not only might the women most affected by the firm's policies be
hindered in their ability to advocate on their own behalf, but the most
343 OPT-IN PROJECT REPORT, supra note 277, at 4.
344 See Edelman, Erlanger, & Lande, supra note 308, at 507 ("Given the formal
inequality of employers (or managers) and employees, and the fact that employees who
have discrimination complaints often fear retaliation, employees may have difficulty
being strong advocates on their own behalf.").
345 See Sturm, A Structural Approach, supra note 19, at 499 ("Women developed an
internal (and external) presence and a vehicle for expressing their concerns as a group.
This enabled women who were reluctant to raise concerns individually to participate
without creating an adversarial relationship with the firm or risking their personal
position.").
346 Here we might think of women partners as somewhat analogous to in-house
counsel-they are lawyers for the organization. In this sense, they might be more likely
"to adopt distinctly managerial orientations, entrepreneurially seeking to 'add value' to
the organization's bottom line" rather than "engaging in the internal equivalent of 'cause
lawyering."' Edelman & Suchman, supra note 308, at 982.
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marginalized women associates may be left out entirely. Minority women
make up only one percent of equity partners at the nation's law firms. 347 We
cannot necessarily expect white women to understand or account for the
situation of minority women. Those women who have "made it" might have
little incentive and limited ability to consider those who have not. As Lani
Guinier and Martha Minow remark in response to Sturm's ADVANCE case
study, "partial inclusion means that diversity programs may open the door
selectively-and the most privileged of the excluded group, those least likely
to disrupt the framework, may be the most likely to come in., 348 White
women partners may help bring more white women associates along while
minority women continue to experience the results of race and gender bias.
And just as with the CAC process in Montgomery County, a collaborative
process with laudable aims and some indicators of success may make
minority women's ability to contest the institutional culture even more
difficult.
Furthermore, for minority women at law firms, the move to second-
generation discrimination may be premature. The ABA Commission on
Women found that nearly half of minority women reported frequent and
blatant racism in the workplace.349 In its attempt to be holistic, then, New
Governance theory may lose the specificity of experience and fallback on
essentialized notions of gender. 350 While the turn away from court-centered
strategies may make sense for white women, it may forsake opportunities to
advocate on behalf of and improve the conditions of employment for women
of color.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps because Susan Sturm herself is charting new territory by
bringing New Governance to an identity-based, anti-discrimination context,
she recognizes that given the "regulatory ambitiousness" of New
347 See Kimberly Atkins, Women and minorities struggle to advance in top law
firms, DAILY RECORD, Apr. 24, 2007 (relying on studies by the National Association of
Women Lawyers and The Vault).
348 Lani Guinier & Martha Minow, Preface to Responses: Dynamism, Not Just
Diversity, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 269, 275. Carle, supra note 139, at 337 ("In the case
[of] ADVANCE, for example, should the relatively few women who have 'made it'
within existing institutional configurations speak for those who have not?").
349 Jill Schachner Chanen, Early Exits, ABA J., Aug. 2006, at 33, 37.
350 See Guinier & Minow, supra note 348, at 275 (noting in response to Sturm's
ADVANCE case study that "[p]ersistent failure to address women of color reflects in no
small measure the defects in categorical thinking").
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Governance, those in the movement must "address head-on the consequences
of requiring new governance methods where those conditions do not
currently exist."351 By exploring examples implicating identity-based issues,
this Article attempts to illuminate those conditions, asnd in doing so, to pull
back on the totalizing, enthusiastic embrace of New Governance strategies.
My purpose is not to dismiss New Governance or to suggest its resonance
only when litigation fails, but to recognize its contextuality and to reframe it
as a contingent model of cause lawyering. In doing so, I hope to have shown
that New Governance success depends heavily on the relationships among
the parties involved, the substantive issues at stake, and the role of law and
lawyers both inside and outside the New Governance regime. At the same
time, exposing instances of New Governance failure attests to the continued
viability of rights-claiming techniques as a way to advance substantive
equality for marginalized groups and individuals.
351 Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes, supra note 11, at 324.
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